CICERO DE AMICITIA.

CHAPTER I.

QUINTUS MUCIUS Augur, solebat narrare multa de
(1.) *Quintus Macius, the Augur, was wont to tell many stories of*
suo socero, C. Lælio, memoriter, et jucunde;
his father-in-law, Caius Lælius, with good memory, and in a pleasant way;
neque dubitare in omni sermone appellare
and he did not hesitate in the whole of his discourse to call him
sapientem. Autem ego, sumpta toga virili, eram deductus
a philosopher. But I, on assuming the garb of manhood, was introduced
a patre ad Scævolam ita ut, quoad possem et
by my father to Scævolam in such a way that, as far as I could and was
liceret, numquam discederem a senis latere. Itaque
allowed, I never went away from the old man's side. And so I
mandabam memoriæ multa prudenter disputata ab eo, etiam
committed to memory many wise discussions of his, and also
multa breviter et commode dicta; studebamque fieri
many pithy and neat sayings; and I was anxious to grow more
doctior ejus prudentia. Quo mortuo contuli me ad
learned through his wisdom. And on his death I betook myself to
pontificem Scævolam, quem audeo dicere unum præstantissimum
the pontifex Scævola, whom I venture to call the one most prominent man
nostræ civitatis et ingenio et justitia. Se de hoc alias;
of our State both in talent and in justice. But of this at another time;
nunc redeo ad Augurem.
now I return to the Augur.

Quum multa sæpe, tum, memini,
(2.) *Both on many other occasions, and especially at that time, I remember*
sedentem domi in hemicyclio, ut solebat quum et ego essem
that, sitting at home in his arm-chair, as he was accustomed when both I was

una, et pauci admodum familiares, illum incidere in eum
with him, and a few very intimate friends, he fell upon that
sermonem qui erat tum in fere omnibus ore. Enim meministi,
topic which was then on almost everybody's lips. For you remember, I
profecto, Attice, et eo magis quod multum utebare
suppose, Atticus, and the more so because you were very intimate with
P. Sulpicio, quum is, tribunus plebis, dissideret capitali
Publius Sulpicius, when he, as tribune of the people, was at variance in deadly
odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul, quocum
hatred with Quintus Pompeius, who at that time was consul, with whom he
vixerat conjunctissime et amantissime, quanta esset vel
had lived on very intimate and friendly terms, how great was either
admiratio vel querela hominum. Itaque tum Scævola,
the wonder or complaint of the people. (3.) *And so at that time Scævola,*
quum incidisset in eam ipsam mentionem, exposuit nobis ser-
when he had lighted on that very subject, set forth to us the dis-
monem Lælii de Amicitia habitum ab illo secum et cum
course of Lælius on Friendship held by the latter with him and with
altero genero, C. Fannio, filio Marci, paucis diebus post
his other son-in-law, Caius Fannius, son of Marcus, a few days after
mortem Africani. Sententias ejus disputationis mandavi
the death of Africanus. The heads of that discussion I committed
memoriæ; quas exposui hoc libro meo arbitratu; enim
to memory; and these I have set forth in this book of my own free will; for I
induxi quasi loquentes ipsos, inquam et
introduced them as it were speaking in person, that the words 'I say' and
inquit ne interponeretur sæpius, atque ut sermo vide-
'he says' might not come in too often, and that the discourse might
retur haberi tamquam a præsentibus coram. Enim quum
seem to be held as it were by people actually present in person. For as you
sæpe ageres mecum ut scriberem aliquid de
often negotiated with me that I might write something on the subject of
Amicitia, res visa est mihi digna quum cognitione omnium
Friendship, the subject seemed to me worthy both of the knowledge of all
tum nostra familiaritate. Itaque feci non invitus ut pro-
and of our intimacy. And so I did it not unwillingly that I might
dessem multis tuo rogatu. Sed ut, in Catone Majore
benefit many at your request. (4.) *But as, in the case of the Cato Major*
qui est scriptus ad te de Senectute, induxi senem
which was written to you on the subject of Old Age, I introduced the old man

Catonem disputantem quia nulla persona videbatur aptior quæ
Cato in discussion because no character seemed more suitable to
loqueretur de illa ætate quam ejus qui et diutissime
speak about that period of life than his who both for the longest time
fuisset senex, et floruisset præ ceteris in senectute ipsa;
had been an old man, and had flourished above all others in old age itself;
sic quum accepissemus a patribus familiaritatem
so since I heard from my ancestors that the intimacy between
C. Lælii et P. Scipionis fuisse maxime memorabilem,
Caius Lælius and Publius Scipio was very noteworthy, the
persona Lælii visa est mihi idonea quæ dissereret ea ipsa
character of Lælius seemed to me well adapted to discuss those very points
de Amicitia quæ Scævola meminisset disputata
on the subject of Friendship which Scævola remembered to have been discussed
ab eo. Autem hoc genus sermonum positum in auctoritate
by him. But this kind of discourse depending on the authority
hominum veterum, et eorum illustrium, videtur nesio quomodo
of men of old, and those, too, men of fame, seems somehow or other
habere plus gravitatis. Itaque legens ipse mea inter-
to have more weight. And so when I read my own writings I some-
dum afficior sic ut existimem Catonem loqui,
times am affected in such a way as to think that it is Cato speaking, and
non me. Sed ut tum scripsi senex ad senem de
not myself. (5.) *But just as then I wrote as an old man to an old man on the*
Senectute, sic hoc libro scripsi de Amicitia
subject of Old Age, so in this book I have written on the subject of Friendship
amicissimus ad amicum. Tum Cato est locutus,
as a most intimate friend to a friend. On that occasion Cato spoke, than
quo fere nemo illis temporibus erat senior, nemo prudentior;
whom scarcely anyone in those days was older, none wiser; and
nunc Lælius et sapiens—enim sic est habitus—et ex-
now it is Lælius who is both a philosopher— for so he is considered—and pre-
cellens gloria amicitiæ, loquitur de Amicitia. Velim
eminent in renown for friendship, speaks on the subject of Friendship. I could
tu avertas animum a me parumper, putes
wish that you would turn away your attention from me for awhile, and think
Lælium loqui ipsum. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius
that Lælius is speaking in person. Caius Fannius and Quintus Mucius
veniunt ad socerum post mortem Africani. Ab
come to the house of their father-in-law after the death of Africanus. With

his sermo oritur. Lælius respondet; tota cujus
these the conversation takes its rise. Lælius replies; and the whole of his
disputatio est de Amicitia, legens quam tu cognosces
discussion is on Friendship, and when you read it you will recognise
te ipsum.
yourself.

CHAPTER II.

ISTA sunt, Læli; enim nec fuit quisquam
(6.) *F. Your arguments are true, Lælius; for never has there been any*
melior nec clarior vir Africano. Sed debes existimare
better or more illustrious man than Africanus. But you ought to consider
oculos omnium esse nunc conjectos in te; te unum
that the eyes of all are now fixed upon you; you above all others
et appellant et existimant sapientem. Hoc modo
they both call and deem a philosopher. This title was lately
tribuebatur M. Catoni, scimus apud nostros patres
given to Marcus Cato, and we know that in the time of our fathers
L. Atilium esse appellatum sapientem. Sed uterque quodam
Lucius Atilius was called a philosopher. But each in a certain
alio modo—Atilius quia putabatur esse prudens in civili jure,
different way — Atilius because he was thought to be learned in civil law,
Cato quia habebat usum multarum rerum. Multa
Cato because he had experience of many circumstances. Many of
ejus vel prudenter provisa vel constanter acta vel acute responsa
his either wise forecastings or consistent deeds or sharp answers
et in senatu et in foro ferebantur; propterea habebat,
both in the Senate and in the forum were reported; wherefore he had, as it
quasi, cognomen sapientis jam in senectute. Autem te alio
were, the title of philosopher now in his old age. But you in a different
quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio
kind of way not only by nature and manners, but also in zeal
et doctrina, esse sapientem—nec sicut vulgus, sed
and learning, are a philosopher—and not as the general run of men, but
ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem,
as educated men are wont to call one a philosopher, such as there is

neminem tota Græcia. Nam qui appellantur Septem
none other in Greece. (7.) *For those who are called the Seven Sages*
qui quærunt ista subtilius non habent in
people who look into these matters more carefully do not reckon among the
numero sapientium: unum accepimus Athenis
number of philosophers: one man we have heard of at Athens to have been
judicatum sapientissimum, et eum, quidem, oraculo
adjudged the greatest philosopher in the world, and that, too, by the oracle
Apollinis. In te existimant esse sapientiam hanc ut
of Apollo. In you they think there is philosophy of such a kind that you
ducas omnia tua posita in te, casusque humanos
deem all your actions to depend on yourself, and all the chances of life
inferiores virtute. Itaque quærunt ex me— credo
to be in a lower scale than virtue. And so they ask of me—and I believe
ex te item, Scævola—quonam pacto feras mortem Africani;
of you also, Scævola —in what manner you bear the death of Africanus;
eoque magis quod his proximis Nonis, quum venissemus in
and the more so because on these most recent Nones, when we had come into
hortos D. Bruti auguris, causa commentandi ut
the gardens of Decius Brutus the augur, for the purpose of deliberating as
assolet, tu non affuisti, qui esses solitus semper obire
usual, you were not present, though you had been accustomed ever to observe
illum diem et illud munus diligentissime.
that day and that duty with the greatest care.

Multi, quidem, quærunt, C. Læli, ut est dictum a Fannio;
(8.) *Sc. Many, indeed, do ask, Caius Lælius, as has been said by Fannius;*
sed ego respondeo— id quod animadverti— te ferre moderate
but I make answer—a point which I have noticed—that you bear temperately
dolorem quem acceperis morte viri quum
the grief which you have experienced by the death of a man both of the
summi, tum amicissimi; potuisse nec
greatest excellence, and also your most intimate friend; and that you could not
non commoveri, nec fuisse id tuæ humani-
fail to be affected, nor was such a thing in accordance with your kindly
tatis; autem quod non affuisses his Nonis in
nature; eut as to your not having been present on these last Nones in
nostro collegio, respondeo valitudinem fuisse causam, non mœsti-
our assembly, I reply that, ill-health was the cause, and not sorrow.
tiam. Tu recte quidem, et vere, Scævola; enim nec
L. And you said so rightly indeed, and truly, Scævola; for neither

debui abduci ab isto officio quod semper usurpavi
ought I to have been diverted from that duty which I always undertook
quum valerem meo incommodo; nec arbitror hoc posse ullo
when I was well by my indisposition; nor do I think that this can by any
casu contingere constanti homini—ut fiat ulla intermissio
chance occur to a consistent man —that there should be any omission
officii. Autem tu, Fanni, qui dicis tantum tribui mihi
of duty. (9.) *But you, Fannius, who say that so much honour is given me*
quantum ego nec agnosco nec postulo, facis amice; sed, ut
as I neither recognise nor demand, act in a friendly way; but, as
videris mihi, non recte judicas de Catone. Enim aut
you seem to me, you do not form a right judgment on Cato. For either
nemo, quod, quidem, magis credo, fuit sapiens, aut, si
no one, as, indeed, I rather think, has ever been a real philosopher, or, if
quisquam, ille fuit. Enim, ut omittam alia, quomodo
anyone was, surely he was. For, to pass over everything else, how he
tulit filii mortem! Memineram Paullum; videram Gallum; sed
bore his son's death! I remember Paullus; I had seen Gallus; but
hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro. Quamo-
these in their boyhood, Cato in full and tried manhood. (10.) *Where-*
brem cave, ne anteponas Catoni, quidem istum ipsum quem
fore, beware you do not prefer to Cato, even that very man whom
Apollo, ut ais, judicavit sapientissimum. Enim hujus
Apollo, as you say, adjudged the greatest philosopher. For in the one case
facta, illius dicta, laudantur. Autem de me, ut
deeds, in the other case words, are approved. But as regards myself, that I
jam loquar cum utroque, habetote sic.
may now speak with both of you, you must hold this opinion.

CHAPTER III.

Si ego negem me moveri desiderio Scipionis, sapientes
If I were to deny that I am affected by regret for Scipio, philosophers
viderint quam faciam id recte; sed certe mentiar.
will see to it how far I should do so rightly; but surely I should speak
Enim moveor, orbatus tali amico qualis nemo
falsely. For I am affected, bereaved as I am of such a friend as no one else
umquam erit ut arbitror; et, ut possum confirmare, nemo
will ever be in my judgment; and, as I can confidently assert, no one at

certe fuit. Sed non egeo medicina; consolor
any rate ever has been. But I do not require an antidote; for I comfort
ipse me, et maxime eo solatio, quod careo eo errore
myself, and especially with this solace, that I am free from that mistake by
quo plerique solent angi decessu amicorum. Enim
which most people are wont to be harassed on the departure of friends. For I
puto nihil mali accidisse Scipio; si quid accidit,
consider that no evil has happened to Scipio; if any has happened, it has
accidit mihi; autem, graviter angi suis incommodis est
happened to me; now, to be seriously grieved at one's misfortunes is
amantis non amicum, sed seipsum.
the token of a man who loves not his friend, but himself.

Vero cum illo quis neget esse actum præclare?
(11.) *But with him who would deny that things have gone excellently well?*
Enim nisi—quod ille minime putabat — vellet optare
For unless—which he least of all was inclined to think—he chose to desire
immortalitatem, quid est non adeptus quod esset fas homini
immortality, what has he not obtained which it were lawful for a man
optare? Qui continuo adolescens, virtute incredibili,
to wish for? For he at once in early manhood, by merit that surpasses belief,
superavit summam spem civium quam habuerant de eo
transcended the highest expectation of the citizens which they entertained of him
jam puero; qui numquam petivit consulatum,
when still a boy; and, again, he never competed for the consulship, and
est bis factus consul—primum ante tempus, iterum
yet was twice elected consul — first before the proper time, and again at a
tempore suo sibi, pæne sero reipublicæ; qui,
period suited to himself, but almost too late for the State; and, again, by
eversis duabus urbibus inimicissimis huic imperio, delevit
overthrowing two cities most hostile to this empire, he put an end
bella non modo præsentia, verum etiam futura. Quid di-
to wars not only for the present, but also for the future. Why should I
cam de facillimis moribus? De pietate in matrem?
speak of his most courteous manners? Of his affection to his mother? Of his
Liberalitate in sorores? Bonitate in suos?
generosity towards his sisters? Of his goodness towards his own people?
Justitia in omnes? Sunt nota vobis. Autem quam carus
Of justice towards all? All this is well known to you. But how dear
fuerit civitati est indicatum mœrore funeris. Quid
he was to the State has been shown by the grief at his funeral. How,

igitur, potuisset accessio paucorum annorum juvare hunc? Enim
then, could the addition of a few years have helped him? For
senectus, quamvis sit non gravis, ut memini Catonem anno
old age, though it is not burdensome, as I remember Cato the year
ante quam mortuus est disserere mecum et cum Scipione, tamen
before his death argued with myself and with Scipio, yet
aufert eam viriditatem in qua Scipio etiam nunc erat.
it takes away that haleness in which Scipio even then found himself.

Quamobrem vita quidem fuit talis vel fortuna vel
(12.) *Wherefore his life indeed was such either through good fortune or*
gloria ut nihil posset accedere; autem, celeritas
fame that nothing could be added to it; moreover, the speedy nature of
moriendi abstulit sensum. De quo genere mortis est difficile
his death took away all feeling. And of this kind of death it is difficult
dictu; videtis quid homines suspicentur. Hoc, tamen,
to speak; but you see what people surmise about it. This, however, we
licet vere dicere, P. Scipioni, ex multis diebus quos vi-
may truly say, that to Publius Scipio, of the many days which he
derit in vita celeberrimos lætissimosque, illum diem fuisse claris-
saw in life so full of fame and joy, that day was the most
simum quum, senatu dimisso, est reductus domum ad
renowned when, after the Senate had broken up, he was led back home at
vesperum a Patribus conscriptis, a sociis Romani populi et
evening by the Members of the Senate, by the allies of the Roman people and
Latinis pridie quam excessit e vita; ut ex tam alto
the Latins the day before he departed from this life; so that from so high a
gradu dignitatis videatur pervenisse ad deos superos potius
degree of honour he seems to have gone to the gods above rather
quam ad inferos.
than to the gods below.

CHAPTER IV.

Enim neque assentior his qui nuper cœperunt
(13.) *For I do not agree, with those who have lately begun*
disserere hæc animos interire simul cum corporibus,
to discuss these questions, that spirits die together with the bodies,
atque omnia deleri morte. Auctoritas antiquorum
and that all things are destroyed by death. The authority of the ancients

plus valet apud me; vel nostrorum majorum qui tribuerunt
has more weight with me; either that of our ancestors who assigned to the
mortuis tam religiosa jura — quod profecto non fecissent
dead such sacred privileges—which they certainly would not have done
si arbitrarentur nihil pertinere ad eos—vel eorum qui fuerunt
if they thought that nothing belonged to them— or of those who lived
in hac terra erudieruntque Magnam Græciam, quæ nunc quidem
in this land and educated Magna Græcia, which now indeed
est deleta, tum florebat, suis institutis et præceptis;
is destroyed, but at that time was flourishing, by their customs and regulations;
vel ejus qui est judicatus sapientissimus oraculo
or of that man who was adjudged the greatest philosopher of all by the oracle
Apollinis, qui non tum dicebat hoc tum illud ut plerique
of Apollo, who did not at one time say this and at another that as most people
sed semper idem — hominum animos esse divinos,
do, but always the same thing—that human spirits are divine, and that
quumque excessissent e corpore reditum in cœlum patere
when they have departed from the body a return to heaven is open to
iis cuique optimo et justissimo expeditissimum.
them and to all the best and most righteous one of the speediest nature. (14). *And*
Quod idem videbatur Scipioni, qui quidem, quasi præ-
this same opinion was held by Scipio, who indeed, as if he had a pre-
sagiret, perpaucis diebus ante mortem, quum et Philus et Manilius
sentiment, a very few days before his death, when both Philus and Manilius
et plures alii adessent, tuque etiam, Scævola, venisses mecum,
and many others were present, and you also, Scævola, had come with me,
disseruit triduum de Republica; cujus disputationis fere
argued for three days about the State; and of this discussion almost the
extremum fuit de immortalitate animorum— quæ dicebat se
last topic was on the immortality of spirits — things which he said he
audissè ex Africano in quiete per visum. Si id est ita ut
had heard from Africanus in sleep through a vision. If it is the case that
animus cujusque optimi evolet facillime in morte, tamquam,
the spirit of all the best people flits away the most easily in death, as it were,
e custodia vinculisque corporis, cui censemus fuisse faciliorem
from the ward and prison of the body, who do we think had a readier
cursum ad deos quam Scipio? Quocirca vereor ne mœrere
passage to the gods than Scipio? Wherefore I fear that to sorrow over
hoc eventu ejus sit invidi magis quam amici.
this fortune of his is the part of one who is envious rather than a friend.

Autem sin illa veriora, ut interitus animorum
But if the other statements are more true, that the destruction of spirits
et corporum sit idem, nec ullus sensus maneat, ut est
and bodies is identical, and that no other feeling is left, as there is
nihil boni in morte sic certe nihil mali. Enim sensu
no good in death, so at any rate there is no evil. For when feeling is
amisso fit idem quasi non esset natus omnino; tamen
lost it is just the same as if he had not been born at all; and yet that
quem esse natum et nos gaudemus, et hæc civitas dum erit
he was born both we rejoice, and this state as long as it shall
lætabitur. Quamobrem, cum illo, quidem, ut dixi supra,
exist will be glad. (15.) *Wherefore, with him, indeed, as I said above,*
est actum optime; mecum incommodius; quem
it has fared excellently well; but with me things are worse; in whose case it
fuerat æquius ut introieram prius, sic exire
had been more just that as I had entered it before him, so I should depart
e vita prius. Sed tamen fruor recordatione nostræ amicitiæ
from life before him. But yet I enjoy the recollection of our friendship
sic ut videar vixisse beate, quia vixerim cum
to such a degree that I seem to have lived a happy life, because I lived with
Scipione; quocum mihi fuit conjuncta cura de re
Scipio; for with him I had a joint charge with regard to matters
publica et privata, quocum communis et domus et militia,
public and private, with him I shared both home and military service,
et id in quo est omnis vis amicitiæ — summa consensio
and that in which lies all the force of friendship—a most complete unanimity
voluntatum, studiorum sententiarum. Itaque non tam ista
of wishes, pursuits and ideas. And thus it is not so much that
fama sapientiæ quam Fannius commemoravit modo
reputation for philosophy which Fannius mentioned just now that
delectat me, præsertim falsa, quam quod spero memoriam
delights me, especially if it is false, as the fact that I hope that the memory
nostræ amicitiæ fore sempiternam. Idque est eo magis cordi mihi
of our friendship will be eternal. And this is the more delightful to me
quod, ex omnibus seculis, vix tria aut quatuor paria amicorum
because, out of all generations, scarcely three or four pairs of friends
nominantur; in quo genere videor sperare amicitiam
are mentioned; and in this class I seem to hope that the friendship of
Scipionis et Lælii fore notam posteritati. Istud, quidem,
Scipio and Lælius will be known to future ages. (16.) *F. That, indeed,*

Læli, est necesse ita. Sed quoniam fecisti mentionem
Lælius, must be so. But since you have made mention of
amicitiæ et sumus otiosi, feceris pergratum mihi
friendship and we are at leisure, you will do a very great pleasure to me and to
Scævolæ item, spero, si, quemadmodum soles de ceteris
Scævola also, I hope, if, just as you are wont in the case of all other
rebus, quum quæruntur ex te, sic disputaris de
subjects, when questions are asked of you, so you will argue on the subject of
amicitia—quid sentias, qualem existimes
friendship—what your feeling is, of what character you consider it to be, and
quæ præcepta des. Mihi, vero, erit pergratum;
what instructions you give. Sc. To me, indeed, it will be a very great pleasure;
atque quum conarer agere id ipsum tecum, Fannius ante-
and when I was trying to negotiate that very matter with you, Fannius fore-
vertit; quamobrem feceris admodum gratum utrique nostrum.
stalled me; and so you will do a very great pleasure to both of us.

CHAPTER V.

EGO vero non gravarer, si confiderem ipse mihi; nam et
(17.) *L. I indeed should not take it amiss, if I trusted my own self; for both*
res est præclara, et sumus otiosi, ut Fannius dixit. Sed
the subject is a glorious one, and we are at leisure, as Fannius has said. But
quis sum ego? Aut quæ facultas est in me? Ista est consuetudo
who am I? Or what power lies in me? This is a custom with
doctorum, eaque, Græcorum, ut ponatur iis de
learned men, and those, too, Greeks, to have a subject set before them on
quo disputent, quamvis subito. Est magnum opus,
which they may argue, however impromptu. It is a great task, and
egetque non parva exercitatione. Quamobrem quæ possunt
requires no small practice. Wherefore the points which may
disputari de amicitia censeo petatis ab eis qui
be argued on the subject of friendship I think you should seek from those who
profitentur ista; ego possum tantum hortari vos ut anteponatis
profess such things; I can only advise you to prefer
amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis. Enim est nihil tam ap-
friendship to all other things in life. For there is nothing so in accord-
tum naturæ tam conveniens ad res, vel secundas vel
ance with nature or so adapted to circumstances, whether prosperous or

adversas. Sed hoc primum sentio amicitiam non posse
the reverse. (18.) *But this is my first feeling that friendship cannot*
esse nisi in bonis. Neque reseco id ad vivum, ut illi
exist except amongst good people. Nor do I cut this to the quick, as those do
qui disserunt hæc subtilius vere, fortasse, sed parum ad
who argue these matters more nicely, with truth perhaps, but too little for
communem utilitatem; enim negant quemquam virum esse
the general advantage; for they deny that any man can be
bonum, nisi sapientem. Ita sit sane; sed interpretantur eam
good, except a philosopher. So be it then; but they mean that
sapientiam quam nemo mortalis est adhuc consecutus; autem,
philosophy which no human being has ever yet attained; whereas,
nos debemus spectare ea quæ sunt in communi usu
we ought to look to those things which are found in general experience
vitaque, non ea quæ finguntur aut optantur. Ego
and life, and not to those which are imagined or desired. I shall
numquam dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos nostri majores judicabant sapientes fuisse sapientes
never say that Caius Fabricius, Manius Curius, or Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors adjudged to be philosophers were philosophers
ad istorum normam. Quare habeant sibi
according to their standard. Wherefore they may keep for themselves that
nomen sapientiæ et invidiosum et obscurum; concedantque ut
title of philosophy so full of envy and mystery; and let them grant that
hi fuerint boni viri. Ne quidem id facient; negabunt
these were good men. But not even that will they do; for they will deny
id posse concedi nisi sapienti. Igitur agamus
that this can be granted except to a philosopher. (19.) *Let us therefore treat*
pingui Minerva, ut aiunt. Qui ita gerunt se,
with dull wit, as the saying is. Those who so conduct themselves, and
ita vivunt ut eorum fides, integritas, æquitas liberalitas proso *live that their good faith, uprightness, fairness and generosity is ap-*
betur, sit nec in illis ulla cupiditas vel libido, vel
proved, and so that there is not in them any spirit of greed or lust, or
audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ii fuerunt quos
boldness, and so that they are men of great consistency, as those were whom
modo nominavi— putemus hos ut sunt
I have just mentioned — let us consider that they as they have been con-
habiti sic etiam appellandos 'bonos,' quia quantum homines
sidered so also must be called 'good,' because us far as men

possunt sequuntur naturam, optimam ducem bene vivendi.
can they follow nature, the best guide to a good life.
Enim videor mihi perspicere sic — nos esse natos
For I seem to myself to look at the matter in this light—that we were born
ita ut esset inter omnes quædam societas, autem
on such terms that there was between us all a certain bond of fellowship, and
major ut quisque accederet propius. Itaque cives
greater in proportion as each came closer to it. And so citizens are
potiores quam peregrini, et propinqui quam alieni; enim cum his
preferable to foreigners, and relations to strangers; for with them
natura ipsa peperit amicitiam, sed ea habet non satis
Nature herself has given birth to friendship, but it has not sufficient
firmitatis. Namque amicitia præstat propinquitati hoc quod
strength. For friendship excels relationship in the fact that whilst
benevolentia potest tolli ex propinquitate, non potest tolli
goodwill can be removed from relationship, it cannot be removed
ex amicitia; enim sublata benevolentia nomen amicitiæ
from friendship; for if you take away goodwill the very name of friendship
tollitur, propinquitatis manet. Autem quanta
is removed, whilst that of relationship remains. (20.) *Now how great the*
vis amicitiæ sit potest maxime intelligi ex hoc quod ex
force of friendship is can be best understood from this fact, that from the
infinita societate humani generis, quam natura ipsa
unlimited bond of fellowship between the human race, which nature herself
conciliavit, res est ita contracta et adducta in
has welded together, the matter has become so confined and reduced to such
angustum ut omnis caritas jungatur aut inter duos aut
narrow limits that all affection is cemented either between two people or
inter paucos.
amongst a few.

CHAPTER VI.

AUTEM amicitia est nihil aliud nisi summa consensio omnium
Now friendship is nothing else than the most complete unanimity on all
rerum divinarum humanarumque, cum benevolentia et
points divine and human, combined with goodwill and
caritate; qua, quidem, haud scio an sapientia
affection; than which, indeed, I am inclined to think that, philosophy only

excepta, nihil melius sit datum homini a immortalibus
excepted, no better gift has been given to man by the immortal
diis. Alii præponunt divitias, alii valitudinem, alii potentiam, alii
gods. Some prefer riches, others good health, others influence, others
honores, multi etiam voluptates. Hoc extremum, quidem, est
honours, and many even pleasure. This last, indeed, belongs
beluarum; autem illa superiora caduca et incerta,
to the brute creation; whilst those former objects are frail and uncertain,
posita non tam in nostris consiliis quam in temeritate fortunæ.
depending not so much on our plans as on the freaks of fortune.
Autem qui ponunt summum bonum in virtute—illi, quidem,
But those who place the highest good in virtue — they, indeed,
præclare; sed haec ipsa virtus et gignit et continet
do excellently well; but this very virtue both gives birth to and comprises
amicitiam; nec potest amicitia esse sine virtute ullo pacto.
friendship; nor can friendship exist without virtue in any possible way.
Jam interpretemur virtutem ex consuetudine vitæ
(21.) *Now let us understand virtue in accordance with the habit of our life*
nostrique sermonis; nec metiamur eam ut quidam docti
and our conversation; and let us not estimate it as some learned
magnificentia verborum; numeremusque
men have done by the splendour of language; and let us account
eos viros bonos, qui habentur, Paulos, Catones, Gallos,
those men to be good, who are so considered, the Pauli, Catos, Galli,
Scipiones, Philos; communis vita est contenta his;
Scipios, and Phili; for general life is satisfied with these men;
autem omittamus eos qui reperiuntur nusquam omnino. Inter
but let us leave out those who are found nowhere at all. Amongst
tales viros, igitur, amicitia habet opportunitates tantas quantas
such men, then, friendship has advantages so great that I
queo vix dicere. Principio qui potest vita esse
can scarcely mention them. (22.) *In the first place, how can a life be*
vitalis, ut Ennius ait, quæ non conquiescat in mutua
worth living, as Ennius says, which does not rest on the reciprocal
benevolentia amici? Quid dulcius quam habere qui-
goodwill of a friend? What is more pleasant than to have one with
cum audeas loqui omnia ut tecum? Quis
whom you may venture to talk about everything just as with yourself? What so
tantus fructus esset in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui
great enjoyment would there be in success, unless you had some-

gauderet. illis æque ac tu ipse? Vero esset difficile
one to rejoice in it equally with yourself? Now it would be difficult
ferre adversas sine eo qui ferret eas etiam gravius quam tu.
to bear reverses without one to feel them even more heavily than oneself.
Denique, cæteræ quæ expetuntur sunt opportunæ singulæ
In short, all other objects which are sought after are advantageous each as
fere singulis rebus—divitias ut utare, opes ut colare,
a rule for one particular object— riches for use, influence for respect,
honores ut laudere, voluptates ut gaudeas, valetudo ut careas
honours for praise, pleasure for enjoyment, health for freedom from
dolore, et fungare corporis muneribus; amicitia
pain, and the performance of physical functions; whereas, friendship
continet plurimas res; quoquo te verteris est præsto;
embraces very many objects: wherever you turn there it is before you;
nullo loco excluditur; est numquam intempestiva, numquam
from no place is it shut out; it is never unreasonable, and never
molesta. Itaque non utimur aqua non igni, ut **aiunt**,
troublesome. And so we do not employ water or fire, as the saying is,
pluribus locis quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc loquor de
on more occasions than friendship. Nor am I now speaking about
vulgari aut mediocri, quæ, tamen, ipsa et delectat et
the common or ordinary kind, which, however, in itself is both delightful and
prodest, sed de vera et perfecta, qualis fuit
profitable, but of the genuine and full-grown kind, such as was the friendship of
eorum pauci qui nominantur. Nam amicitia facit et secundas res
those few who are mentioned. For friendship makes both prosperity
splendidiores et adversas leviores partiens communicansque.
more brilliant and adversity lighter by taking a share and portion of it.

CHAPTER VII.

QUUMQUE amicitia contineat plurimas et maximas commodi-
(23.) *And since friendship embraces very many and very great advan-*
tates, tum illa nimirum præstat omnibus, quod prælucet
tages, it also in this point naturally surpasses all the others, that it casts a gleam
bonam spem in posterum, nec patitur animos
forwards of good hope for the future, and does not suffer the spirits to
debilitari aut cadere. Enim qui intuetur verum amicum
become weakened or to fall. For he who looks at a true friend

intuetur quasi aliquod exemplar sui. Quocirca et
looks, as it were. at a kind of likeness of himself. Wherefore both the
absentes adsunt et egentes abundant, et imbecilli valent, et—
absent are present and the needy have plenty, and the weak are strong, and—
quod est difficilius dictu— mortui vivunt; tantus honos,
what is more difficult to say — the dead live; so great is the honour,
memoria desiderium prosequitur amicorum. Ex quo, illorum
memory and regret that attends them from friends. Hence, in the one case
videtur beata mors, horum laudabilis vita. Quod si
there seems to be a happy death, in the other a praiseworthy life. But if you
exemeris ex natura rerum conjunctionem benevolentiæ, nec
take away from nature the union of goodwill, neither
ulla domus nec urbs poterit stare; ne quidem agri cultus
any house nor city will be able to stand; and not even agriculture will
permanebit. Si id minus intelligitur quanta vis amicitiæ
continue. And if it is not understood how great the force of friendship
concordiæque sit, potest percipi ex dissensionibus atque dis-
and harmony is, this may be gathered from quarrels and dis-
cordiis. Enim quæ domus est tam stabilis, quæ civitas tam
putes. For what house is so firm, or what state so well
firma quæ non possit funditus everti odiis atque dissidiis?
established as not to be able to be utterly overthrown by hatred or strife?
Ex quo potest judicari quantum boni sit in amicitia?
Whence we may form an estimate as to how much good there is in friendship?

Ferunt, quidem, quendam doctum virum Agrigentinum
(24). *They say, indeed, that a learned man of Agrigentum*
vaticinatum Græcis carminibus, amicitiam contrahere discord-
prophesied in Greek verse, saying that friendship unites and variance
iam dissipare quæ constarent in natura rerum
separates those things that are fixed in the natural world and the
totoque mundo, quæque moverentur. Atque hoc,
whole of the universe, and also those things which are in motion. And this,
quidem, omnes mortales et intelligunt et probant re. Itaque
indeed, all people both understand and approve in fact. And so,
si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in aut
if at any time any service is displayed on the part of a friend in either
adeundis aut communicandis periculis, quis est qui non
facing or sharing dangers, who is there that does not
efferat id maximis laudibus? Qui clamores
extol it with the highest praises? What shouts rang through the

tota cavea nuper, in nova Fabula mei hospitis
whole theatre lately, on the occasion of the new play of my guest
et amici M. Pacuvii, quum rege ignorante uter
and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when on the king not knowing which of the two
esset Orestes, Pylades diceret se esse Orestem, ut
was Orestes, Pylades declared that he was Orestes, that he might be
necaretur pro illo; autem Orestes perseveraret se esse Orestem,
put to death in his stead; but Orestes maintained that he was Orestes,
ita ut erat. Stantes plaudebant in ficta re; quid
as he actually was. They stood up and applauded at a fictitious case; what
arbitramur fuisse facturos in vera? Natura, ipsa
do we think they would have done in a real case? Nature, of her own
facile indicabat suam vim, quum homines judicarent id
accord easily showed her force, since people decided that to
recte fieri in altero quod possent non facere ipsi.
be rightly done in the case of another which they could not do themselves.
Hactenus videor mihi potuisse dicere quid sentirem de
Thus far I seem to myself to have been able to say what I felt on
amicitia. Si sunt qua præterea—autem credo
the subject of friendship. If there are any other points besides — and I believe
esse multa— quæritote, si videbitur, ab iis qui
there are many—you must inquire about them, if it shall seem good, of those who
disputant ista. Autem potius a te; quamquam
discuss such matters. (25.) *F. But we prefer to inquire of you; although*
sæpe quæsivi et audivi ab istis etiam, non invitus,
I have often asked and heard from those people also, not unwillingly,
equidem sed filum tuæ orationis est quoddam aliud.
indeed, but the thread of your speech is somewhat different. Sc. You
Diceres id magis, Fanni, si affuisses nuper in
would say so the more, Fannius, if you had been present lately in the
hortis Scipionis tum quum est disputatum de
gardens of Scipio at the time when there was a discussion on the subject
Republica. Qualis patronus justitiæ tum fuit contra accuratam
of the State. What an advocate of justice he then was in answer to the careful
orationem Phili! Id, quidem, fuit facile, justissimo viro
speech of Philus! F. That, indeed, was easy, for the justest of men
defendere justitiam. Quid amicitiam? Nonne facile
to defend justice. Sc. What about friendship? Is not that an easy
ei qui ceperit maximam gloriam ob eam servatam
subject for him who won the highest renown through its being preserved
summa fide, constantia justitiaque?
with the greatest good faith, consistency and justice?

CHAPTER VIII.

Hoc, quidem, est afferre vim ; enim quid refert qua
(26.) *L. This, indeed, is applying force; for what does it matter by what*
rogatione cogatis me ? Cogitis certe. Enim est quum
questions you compel me? For compel me you certainly do. For it is both
difficile tum ne quidem æquum obsistere studiis generorum,
difficult and also not even fair to resist the zeal of sons-in-law,
præsertim in bona re. Sæpissime, igitur, cogitanti de amici-
especially in a good case. Very often, then, when I think about friend-
tia, illud solet videri mihi maxime considerandum— utrum
ship, this point is wont to seem to me most worthy of deliberation—whether
amicitia sit desiderata propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam, ut
friendship is longed for on account of weakness and indigence, so
in dandis recipiendisque meritis quisque acciperet
that in the case of giving and receiving services each might receive
ab alio id quod posset minus per se ipse, redderetque
from another what he could not have through himself, and give it back
vicissim, an, quidem, hoc esset proprium amicitiæ. Sed
in return, or whether, indeed, this was peculiar to friendship. But there
alia causa antiquior et pulcrior, et profecta magis a
is another reason of greater antiquity and beauty, and originated more from
natura ipsa. Enim amor—ex quo amicitia nominata—est princeps
Nature herself. For love—from which friendship gets its name—is the prime
ad conjungendam benevolentiam. Nam utilitates, quidem, sæpe
factor in uniting good will. For advantages, indeed, are often
percipiuntur etiam ab iis qui coluntur simulatione amicitiæ
reaped even from those who are courted on a pretence of friendship
et observantur causa temporis. Autem in amicitia
and are honoured for the sake of temporary gain. But in friendship there is
nihil fictum nihil simulatum ; et quidquid est in ea id est verum
no feint and no pretence; and whatever exists in it is genuine
et voluntarium. Quapropter amicitia videtur mihi orta
and spontaneous. (27.) *Wherefore friendship seems to me to have originated*
potius a natura quam ab indigentia, et applicatione
rather with Nature than with want, and from an attachment of
animi, cum quodam sensu amandi potius quam
the mind, together with a certain feeling of love rather than from any
cogitatione quantum utilitatis illa res esset habitura.
thought as to how much advantage that condition would involve. And,

Quidem, quale quod sit potest animadverti in quibusdam
indeed, of what nature this is may be observed in certain of the
bestiis; quæ ita amant ex se natos ad quoddam tempus et
brute creation; for they so love their young up to a certain time and
ita amantur ab eis, ut earum sensus facile appareat. In
are so loved by them, that their feeling is easily seen. And in the
homine quod est multo evidentius; primum, ex ea caritate
case of man this is much more clear; first, owing to that affection
quæ est inter natos et parentes, quæ non potest dirimi
which there is between children and parents, which cannot be torn asunder
nisi detestabili scelere; deinde, quum similis sensus amoris
except by abominable crime; in the next place, as a kindred-feeling of love
exstitit, si nacti sumus aliquem cum cujus moribus et natura con-
arises, if we meet with someone with whose habits and nature
gruamus, quod videamur perspicere in eo, quasi, quoddam lumen
we agree, because we seem to behold in him, as it were, a certain light
probitatis et virtutis. Enim est nihil amabilius virtute,
of integrity and virtue. (28.) *For there is nothing more lovable than virtue,*
nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum, quippe quum propter
nothing that more allures to love, since, owing to
virtutem et probitatem diligamus quodam modo etiam eos quos
virtue and uprightness we love in a certain way even those whom
numquam vidimus. Quis est qui non usurpet memoriam
we have never seen. Who is there who does not regard the memory
C. Fabricii M'. Curii cum aliqua caritate et benevo-
of Caius Fabricius and Manius Curius with some affection and good-
lentia, numquam viderit quos? Autem quis est qui
will, though he has never seen them? But who is there who does
non oderit Tarquinium Superbum, Sp. Cassium Sp.
not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius and Spurius
Mælium? Decertatum de imperio in Italia cum duo-
Mælius? We have contended for supreme power in Italy with two
bus ducibus, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero, propter ejus
great leaders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal; from the one, on account of his
probitatem, habemus animos non nimis alienos, alterum,
integrity, we have our minds not so very much estranged, whilst the other,
propter crudelitatem, hæc civitas semper oderit.
on account of his cruelty, this State will always detest.

CHAPTER IX.

QUOD si vis probitatis est tanta ut diligamus eam vel in eis
(29.) *But if the force of integrity is so great that we love it either in those*
quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod est majus, etiam in
whom we have never seen, or, what is still more, even in the
hoste, quid mirum si hominum animi moveantur quum
case of an enemy, what wonder if people's spirits are affected when
videantur perspicere virtutem et bonitatem eorum quibuscum
they seem to behold the virtue and goodness of those with whom
possuit esse usu conjuncti? Quamquam amor confirmatur et
they may be intimately acquainted? Although love is strengthened both
accepto beneficio et perspecto studio, et adjuncta con-
by receiving kindness and by perceiving zeal, and by the addition of in-
suetudine; quibus rebus adhibitis ad illum primum motum
timacy; for when these attributes are applied to that first impulse
animi et amoris, quædam admirabilis magnitudo benevolentiæ
of the spirit and love, a certain extraordinary greatness of good-will
exardescit. Si qui putant quam proficisci ab imbecillitate,
blazes forth. And if any people think that this arises from weakness,
ut sit per quem quisque assequatur quod desi-
that there may be someone through whom each may attain what he longs
deret, relinquunt, sane, humilem et minime generosum ortum
for, they leave, indeed, a lowly and by no means noble source
amicitiæ, quam volunt natam ex inopia atque
of friendship, which they make out to spring from want of resources and
indigentia. Si quod esset ita, ut quisque arbitraretur esse
need. But if this were so, then as each thought there was
minimum in se, ita esset aptissimus ad amicitiam. Quod
least in himself, so he would be most adapted to friendship. But this
est longe secus. Enim ut quisque plurimum confidit
is far otherwise. (30.) *For in proportion as each man most trusts*
sibi, et ut quisque est maxime munitus virtute et sapientia,
himself, and as each is so very greatly fortified by virtue and philosophy,
ut egeat nullo, judicetque omnia sua posita in
that he requires nothing, and considers all his belongings as dependent on
seipso, ita maxime excellit in expetendis colendisque
himself, even so he is the most prominent in seeking out and cultivating
amicitiis. Enim quid? Africanus indigens mei?
friendships. For what shall I say? Is Africanus in want of me? By

Minime, hercle; ac ne, quidem, ego illius; sed ego
no means, that is certain; nor, indeed, am I in want of him; but I through
quadam admiratione ejus virtutis, ille vicissim, for-
a certain admiration for his virtue loved him, and he in turn, per-
tasse nonnulla opinione quam habebat de meis moribus, dilexit
haps through some idea which he had of my character, loved
me. Consuetudo auxit benevolentiam. Sed quamquam multæ et
me. Intimacy increased good-will. But although many
magnæ utilitates consecutæ sunt, tamen causæ diligendi sunt non
great advantages followed, yet the grounds of love did not
profectæ ab spe earum. Enim ut sumus benefici liberalesque,
proceed from the hope of them. (31.) *For as we are kind and generous,*
non ut exigamus gratiam—enim neque fœnera-
not that we may demand a favour — for we do not, indeed, make a money
mur beneficium, sed sumus natura propensi ad liberalitatem—
business of kindness, but we are naturally disposed to generosity —
sic putamus amicitiam expetendam, non adducti
so we think that friendship ought to be sought, not because we are drawn on
spe mercedis, sed quod omnis ejus fructus inest in
through the hope of gain, but because all its advantage lies in
amore ipso. At ii qui, ritu pecudum, referunt omnia ad
love itself. (32.) *But those who, like cattle, refer everything to*
voluptatem, longe dissentiunt. Nec mirum; enim pos-
pleasure, are widely at variance with us. And no wonder; for those
sunt suspicere nihil altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum, qui
can look up at nothing lofty, nothing splendid and heavenly, who
abjecerunt omnes suas cogitationes in rem tam humilem tamque
have debased all their thoughts to an object so low and, so
contemptam. Quamobrem hos, quidem, removeamus ab hoc
despicable. Wherefore such people, indeed, we should keep away from this
sermone; autem ipsi intelligamus sensum diligendi et
discourse; whilst we ourselves should understand that a feeling of love and
caritatem, benevolentiæ, natura gigni significatione probitatis
affection, of goodwill, is naturally produced when a token of integrity
facta. Qui appetiverunt quam applicant sese et
is shown. And those who seek this devote themselves and
admovent propius, ut fruantur et usu et moribus
bring themselves closer, that they may enjoy both the acquaintance and character
ejus quem cœperunt diligere, sintque pares in amore
of him whom they begin to love, and that they may be equal in love

et æquales propensioresque ad merendum bene quam ad
and on the same terms and more inclined to deserve well than to
reposcendum. Atque sit inter eos hæc honesta certatio.
ask back a favour. And let there be between them this honourable rivalry.
Sic et maximæ utilitates capientur ex amicitia, et
Thus not only will the greatest advantages be derived from friendship, but
ejus ortus et gravior et verior a natura
also its source will be both more important and more genuine from nature
quam ab imbecillitate. Nam si utilitas conglutinaret amicitias,
than from weakness. For if advantage cemented friendships,
eadem, commutata, dissolveret, sed quia natura non potest
it again, when changed, would break them up; but because nature cannot be
mutari, idcirco veræ amicitiæ sunt sempiternæ. Quidem,
changed, on that account true friendships are eternal. Now, indeed,
videtis ortum amicitiæ, nisi, forte, vultis quid ad
you see the source of friendship, unless, perchance, you wish anything in addition
hæc. Tu, vero, tu, perge, Læli; enim respondeo meo
to this. F. Do you, nay, do you, go on, Lælius; for I answer in my own
jure pro hoc, qui est minor natu. Tu
right on behalf of my friend here, who is my junior. (33.) *Sc. And you do*
recte, quidem; quamobrem audiamus.
rightly, indeed; wherefore let us listen.

CHAPTER X.

AUDITE, ergo, optimi viri, ea quæ sæpissime
L. Listen, then, most excellent friends, to those points which very frequently
disserebantur inter Scipionem et me de amicitia.
used to be discussed between Scipio and myself on the subject of friendship.
Quamquam ille, quidem, dicebat nihil esse difficilius quam
Although he, indeed, used to say that nothing was more difficult than
amicitiam permanere usque ad extremum vitæ. Nam sæpe
for friendship to last up to the very end of life. For it often
incidere vel ut utrique non idem expediret, vel ut non
happened either that both had not the same interests, or that they did not
idem sentirent de Republica. Dicebat, etiam,
hold the same opinion on the subject of the State. He said, also, that
hominum mores sæpe mutari, alias adversis rebus, alias
people's characters often changed, sometimes through reverses, at others

ingravescente ætate. Atque capiebat exemplum earum
through the increasing weight of years. And he took an illustration of those
rerum ex similitudine ineuntis ætatis, quod summi
truths from a comparison of the commencement of life, in that the most attached
amores puerorum sæpe ponerentur una cum prætexta.
affections of boys are often laid aside together with the garb of boyhood.
Autem sin perduxissent ad adolescentiam, tamen interdum
(34.) *But if they continue them to early manhood, they still are sometimes*
dirimi contentione vel uxoriæ conditionis vel alicujus
rent asunder by strife arising from either the married state or some
commodi, quod uterque posset non adipisci idem. Quod si qui
advantage, because both could not attain the same object. Or if any
essent provecti longius in amicitia, tamen sæpe labefactari si inci-
have advanced further in friendship, yet they often waver if they
dissent in contentionem honoris; enim esse nullam majorem
come into a competition for office; for there is no greater
pestem amicitiis quam, in plerisque, cupiditatem pecuniæ,
curse to friendships than, in the case of most people, a desire for money,
in quibusque optimis certamen honoris et gloriæ; ex quo
and in all the best a rivalry in office and fame; whence the
maximas inimicitias sæpe exstitisse inter amicissimos.
greatest enmities have often arisen amongst the firmest friends. (35.)
Enim magnæ et, plerumque, justa dissidia nasci quum aliquid
For great and, as a rule, righteous quarrels take place when any
postularetur ab amicis quod esset non rectum, ut essent
request is made of friends which is not right, that they may be
aut ministri libidinis, aut adjutores ad injuriam. Qui re-
either servants of lust, or aiders in wrong-doing. And those who
cusarent quod, quamvis honeste facerent id, tamen arguerent-
refuse this, however honourably they do so, are nevertheless shown
tur deserere jus amicitiæ ab iis quibus nollent
to be abandoning the rights of friendship by those whom they are unwilling
obsequi; autem illos qui auderent postulare quidvis ab
to gratify; whilst those who dare to ask anything they choose of a
amico, profiteri ipsa postulatione se facturos omnia
friend, give out by that very demand that they will do anything for a
amici causa. Eorum querela non modo familiaritates inveteratas
friend's sake. By their differences not only are friendships of long-standing
solere exstingui, sed etiam sempiterna odia gigni. Hæc ita
wont to be destroyed, but also eternal enmities to arise. These so

multa fata, quasi, impendere amicitiis, ut diceret videri sibi
many fates, as it were, hang over friendships, that he said it seemed to him
non modo philosophiæ, sed etiam felicitatis subterfugere
a mark not only of philosophy, but also of good fortune to escape them
omnia.
all.

CHAPTER XI.

QUAMOBREM, videamus primum id, si placet—quatenus
(36.) *Wherefore, let us look first of all to this, if you please— how far*
amor debeat progredi in amicitia. Si Coriolanus habuit amicos,
love should go in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends,
num debuere illi, cum Coriolano, ferre arma contra
ought they, in league with Coriolanus, to have borne arms against
patriam? num debuerunt amici juvare Viscellinum
their Country? ought his friends to have aided Viscellinus when
appetentem regnum, num Sp. Mælium? Videbamus, quidem,
aiming at kingly power, or Spurius Mœlius? (37.) *We saw, it is true,*
Ti. Gracchum derelictum a Q. Tuberone æqualibusque
Tiberius Gracchus deserted by Quintus Tubero and his contemporary
amicis vexantem Rempublicam. At C. Blossius Cumanus,
friends when harassing the State. But Caius Blossius Cumanus, the
hospes vestræ familiæ, Scævola, cum venisset ad me, qui aderam
friend of your family, Scævola, when he had come to me, who was present
consulibus Lænati et Rupilio in consilio, deprecatum,
to support the consuls Lænas and Rupilius in counsel, to beg indulgence,
afferebat hanc causam ut ignoscerem sibi—quod fecisset Ti.
alleged this reason for my pardoning him— that he had made Tiberius
Gracchum tanti ut putaret sibi faciendum quidquid ille
Gracchus of so much account that he thought he ought to do whatever that
vellet. Tum ego: 'Etiamne si vellet te ferre
great man wished. Thereupon I said: 'What, even if he wished you to carry
faces in Capitolium?' 'Numquam,' inquit, 'voluisset
firebrands into the Capitol?' 'Never,' said he, 'would he have wished
id, quidem; sed, si voluisset, paruissem.' Videtis
that, it is certain; but, if he had wished it, I should have obeyed.' You see
quam nefaria vox; et, hercle, fecit ita, vel etiam plus
what an execrable expression this was; and, indeed, he did so, or even more

quam dixit. Enim ille non paruit temeritati Ti. Grac-
than he said. For he did not obey the rashness of Tiberius Grac-
chi, sed præfuit; nec præbuit se comitem illius furoris,
chus, but headed it; nor did he lend himself as a companion to his madness,
sed ducem. Itaque, hac amentia, perterritus nova
but as a leader. And so, through this act of frenzy, alarmed by the new
quæstione, profugit in Asiam, contulit se ad hostes, persolvit
investigation, he fled into Asia, betook himself to the enemy, and paid a
graves justasque pœnas reipublicæ. Est, igitur, nulla excusatio
heavy and righteous penalty to the State. There is, therefore, no excuse for
peccati si peccaveris amici causa. Nam quum virtus fuerit
a sin if you have sinned for a friend's sake. For when virtue has been
conciliatrix amicitiæ, est difficile amicitiam manere, si
the cementer of friendship, it is difficult for friendship to stand fast, if you
defeceris a virtute. Quod si statuerimus rectum vel
have fallen away from virtue. (38.) *But if we lay it down as right either*
concedere amicis quidquid velint, vel impetrare ab iis quidquid
to grant to friends whatever they wish, or to obtain from them whatever
velimus, quidem simus perfecta sapientia, si res
we wish, we should certainly be men of complete philosophy, supposing the matter
habeat nihil vitii. Sed loquimur de iis amicis qui sunt ante
involve no vice. But we are speaking of those friends who are before
oculos, quos videmus aut de quibus accepimus memoriam, aut
our eyes, whom we see or of whom we have heard traditions, or
quos communis vita novit. Ex hoc numero nobis exempla
whom ordinary life has known. From this category our examples
sunt sumenda; et maxime, quidem, eorum qui accedunt proxime
must be taken; and mostly, indeed, of those who come nearest
ad sapientiam. Videmus Papum Æmilium fuisse familiarem
to philosophy. (39.) *We see that Papus Æmilius was intimate with*
C. Luscino— sic accepimus a patribus—bis consules
Caius Luscinus—so we have heard from our fathers—twice were they consuls
una, et collegas in censura; et tum est proditum
together, and also colleagues in the censorship; and also it is recorded that
M'. Curium et Ti. Coruncanium fuisse conjunctissimos cum iis
Manius Curius and Titus Coruncanius were most closely united with them
et inter se. Igitur possumus ne quidem suspicari quem-
and with each other. Therefore we can not even suspect that
quam horum contendisse quippiam ab amico quod esset contra
any of these strained to obtain anything from a friend that was opposed to

fidem, jusjurandum rempublicam. Nam hoc, quidem, in
good faith, their oath and the State. For as to this, indeed, in the
talibus viris, quid attinet dicere si contendisset
case of such men, what is the need of saying that if anyone had so strained
non fuisse impetraturum, quum illi fuerint sanctissimi
he would not have gained his object, since they were most upright
viri? autem, sit æque nefas facere aliquid tale et
men? and, indeed, it is equally criminal to perform any such request as to make
rogare. At, vero, C. Carbo, C. Cato sequebantur Ti.
the request. And yet, indeed, Caius Carbo and Caius Cato followed Tiberius
Gracchum, tunc, quidem, frater Caius minime,
Gracchus, and though at the time, indeed, his brother Caius did not, yet
nunc idem acerrimus.
now again he does so most keenly.

CHAPTER XII.

IGITUR, hæc lex sanciatur in amicitia— ut neque rogemus
(40.) *Let, then, this law be ratified in friendship—that we neither request*
turpes res, nec faciamus rogati. Enim est turpis
dishonourable deeds, nor perform them when requested. For it is a base
excusatio, et minime accipienda, quum in ceteris peccatis,
excuse, and by no means to be admitted, both in the case of all other faults,
tum si quis fateatur se fecisse contra
and especially if a man should confess that he has acted against the interests
rempublicam causa amici. Etenim, sumus locati eo
of the State for the sake of a friend. For, indeed, we are placed in this
loco, Fanni et Scævola, ut nos oporteat prospicere longe
position, Fannius and Scævola, that we must look far ahead
casus reipublicæ futuros. Enim consuetudo jam
to occurrences in the State in time to come. For custom has now
deflexit aliquantulum de spatio curriculoque majorum.
swerved aside just a very little from the course and career of our ancestors.
Ti. Gracchus conatus est occupare regnum, vel is
Tiberius Gracchus tried to seize the kingly power, or rather he
quidem regnavit paucos menses. Num Romanus
indeed did hold that power for a few months. (41.) *Had the Roman*
populus audierat aut viderat quid simile? Quid amici
people ever heard or seen anything like it? But what his friends

et propinqui secuti hunc etiam post mortem effecerint in
and relations who followed him even after his death did in regard to
P. Scipionem queo non dicere sine lacrimis. Nam Carbonem
Publius Scipio I cannot relate without tears. For Carbo
sustinuimus quoquo modo potuimus propter recentem pœnam
we endured in whatever way we could on account of the recent punishment
Ti. Gracchi. Quid, autem, expectem de Gracchi
of Tiberius Gracchus. What, indeed, I anticipate in regard to Gracchus's
tribunatu non libet augurari. Deinde serpit res
tribuneship I do not like to predict. After this comes creeping on a matter
quæ, quum semel cœpit, labitur proclivius ad perniciem. Videtis
which, when it once begins, glides prone to destruction. You see
in tabella quanta labes sit jam facta ante, primo
in the case of the ballot how great a ruin was already effected of old, first
Gabinia, autem biennio post Cassia Lege. Jam
by the Gabinian, and then two years afterwards by the Cassian Law. Already
videor videre populum disjunctum a senatu, maximasque
do I seem to see the people disunited from the senate, and most important
res agi arbitrio multitudinis. Enim plures discent
affairs transacted at the pleasure of the mob. For more people will learn
quemadmodum hæc fiant quam quemadmodum his resis-
how these things are done than how they are
tatur. Quorsum hæc? Quia sine sociis
withstood. (42.) *To what purpose is all this? Because without companions*
nemo conatur quidquam tale. Igitur est præcipiendum
no one attempts anything of the sort. And so we must instruct
bonis ut si aliquo casu ignari inciderint in amicitias
good people that if by any chance they unwittingly light on friendships
ejus modi, ne existiment se ita alligatos ut non discedant
of that kind, they should not think they are so involved as not to separate
ab amicis peccantibus in aliqua magna re. Autem pœna
from their friends if they go wrong in any important matter. But a penalty
est statuenda improbis; nec, vero, minor iis qui
must be appointed for bad men; and not, indeed, a less severe one for those who
erunt secuti alterum quam iis qui fuerint ipsi
shall have followed another than for those who shall have been themselves
duces impietatis. Quis clarior in Græcia Themistocle?
ringleaders in guilt. Who was more famous in Greece than Themistocles?
Quis potentior? Qui, quum imperator bello Persico
Who more influential? A man who, when as general in the war with Persia

liberasset Græciam servitute, propterque invidiam esset expulsus
he had freed Greece from slavery, and on account of jealousy had been driven
in exsilium, non tulit injuriam ingratæ patriæ, quam de-
into exile, did not endure the wrong of an unthankful country, which he ought
buit ferre, fecit idem quod Coriolanus fecerat apud nos
to have endured, but did the same thing as Coriolanus had done in our State
viginti annis ante. Nemo est inventus adjutor his contra
twenty years before. No one was found to aid these men against their
patriam; itaque uterque conscivit sibi mortem. Quare talis
country; and so each committed suicide. (43.) *Wherefore such*
consensio improborum est non modo non tegenda excu-
agreement on the part of bad men is not only not to be covered under the
satione amicitiæ, sed potius vindicanda omni supplicio,
pretext of friendship, but is rather to be visited with every possible punishment,
ut ne quis putet concessum sibi sequi amicum vel inferentem
that no one may think it allowed him to follow a friend even when waging
bellum patriæ. Quod, quidem, ut res cœpit ire,
war against his country. And this, indeed, as things begin to go,
haud scio an sit futurum aliquando. Autem mihi est
I am rather inclined to think will happen some day. But I am
non minor curæ qualis futura sit respublica post meam
no less anxious what will be the character of the State after my
mortem quam qualis sit hodie.
death than what it is to-day.

CHAPTER XIII.

IGITUR, hæc sanciatur prima lex amicitiæ, ut petamus
(44.) *Let, then, this be ratified as the first law of friendship, that we ask*
honesta ab amicis, faciamus honesta amicorum causa;
honourable things from friends, and do honourable things for friends' sakes;
ne quidem exspectendum dum rogemur, studium
and that we do not even wait till we are asked, that zeal be
semper adsit cunctatio absit; gaudeamus, vero, dare
ever present and reluctance absent; that we joy, indeed, in giving
consilium libere; auctoritas amicorum suadentium bene
advice freely; that the influence of friends counselling good have
plurimum valeat in amicitia; eaque et adhibeatur ad
very great weight in friendship; and that it be both applied to giving

monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res
advice not only openly, but also sharply, if the case shall so
postulabit, et adhibitæ pareatur. Nam opinor qui-
require, and that when applied it be obeyed. (45.) *For I think that some*
busdam, quos, audio, habitos sapientes in Græcia, placuisse
people who, I hear, were considered philosophers in Greece, propounded
quædam mirabilia — sed est nihil quod non persequan-
some very wonderful theories—but there is nothing that they do not follow up
tur argutius— nimias amicitias esse partim fugiendas;
too shrewdly—that too strong friendships are partly to be avoided; that it
sit ne necesse unum esse sollicitum pro pluribus; cuique
be not necessary for one person to be anxious for several; that each
esse satis superque suarum rerum;
has enough and more than enough to do with his own affairs; that to be too
nimis implicari alienis esse molestum; esse commo-
much involved in other people's matters is troublesome; that it is most con-
dissimum habere habenas amicitiæ quam laxissimas,
venient to hold the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that you
vel adducas vel remittas quas quum velis; enim caput
may either tighten or slacken them as you choose; for the chief requisite
ad beate vivendum esse securitatem, qua animus possit non
for a happy life is freedom from care, which the spirit cannot
frui, si, tamquam, unus parturiat pro pluribus. Autem
enjoy, if, as it were, one person is to labour for many. (46.) *But they*
aiunt alios dicere, etiam, multo inhumanius—locum quem
say that others declare, and, indeed, much more naturally —a topic on which
perstrinxi breviter paullo ante— amicitias esse expeten-
I touched briefly a little while ago —that friendships are to be sought
das causa præsidii adjumentique non benevolentiæ neque
after for the sake of protection and aid, not of good will or
caritatis. Itaque ut quisque habeat minimum firmita-
affection. And so in proportion as each has least strength
tis viriumque, ita maxime appetere amicitias; ex eo fieri
and vigour, so he most eagerly seeks for friendships; and hence it comes
ut mulierculæ quærant præsidia amicitiarum magis quam
to pass that weak women seek the protection of friendships more than
viri, et inopes quam opulenti, et calamitosi quam beati.
men, and poor more than rich, and those in misfortune more than the happy.
O præclaram sapientam! enim ei qui tollunt amicitiam
(47.) *What excellent philosophy! for those who take away friendship*

e vita videntur tollere solem e mundo—
out of life seem to take away the sun out of the universe—friendship, than
qua habemus nihil melius, nihil jucundius— a immor-
which we have nothing better, nothing more pleasant—given us by the immor-
talibus Diis. Enim quæ est ista securitas?
tal gods. For what is that freedom of care that they mention?
Blanda specie, quidem, sed reapse repudianda multis locis.
Attractive in appearance, it is true, but in reality to be rejected in many points.
Enim, est neque consentaneum aut non suscipere ullam hon-
For, indeed, it is not proper either not to undertake any honour-
estam rem actionemve ne sis sollicitus aut deponere
able action or matter that you may not be anxious or lay it aside when
susceptam. Quodsi fugimus curam, virtus est fugienda, quæ est
taken up. But if we avoid anxiety, virtue must be avoided, which of
necesse aspernetur atque oderit cum aliqua cura res contrarias
necessity must scorn and hate with some anxiety objects opposed
sibi— ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, fortitudo
to itself—just as goodness hates evil, abstinence lust, and bravery
ignaviam. Itaque videas justos maxime dolere in-
cowardice. And so you can see that the righteous are most grieved by un-
justis, fortes imbecillibus, modestos flagitiosis rebus.
righteous, the brave by cowardly, and the temperate by immoderate actions.
Hoc est, ergo, proprium bene constituti animi— et
This is, therefore, the characteristic of a well ordered spirit — both to
lætari bonis rebus, et dolere contrariis. Quamobrem, si
rejoice in good deeds, and to grieve over the opposite. (48.) *Wherefore, if*
dolor animi cadit in sapientem—qui profecto cadit nisi ar-
grief of spirit falls on a philosopher—and it certainly does fall unless we
bitramur humanitatem exstirpatam ex ejus animo—quæ causa
think that human feeling is eradicated from his spirit — what reason
est cur tollamus amicitiam funditus e vita,
is there why we should take friendship entirely away out of life, that we may
ne suscipiamus aliquas molestias propter eam? Enim quid
not undergo a few troubles on account of it? For what is the
interest, sublato motu animi— non dico inter
difference, if you take away the impulse of the spirit— I do not say between a
hominem et pecudem, sed inter hominem et saxum aut truncum—
man and a beast, but between a man and a stone or stock—
aut quidvis ejusdem generis? Enim neque sunt isti
or anything of the same kind? For neither are those people to be

audiendi qui volunt virtutem esse duram et ferream, quasi;
listened to who make out that virtue is hard and of iron, so to speak;
quidem, quæ quum in multis rebus, tum in ami-
whereas, indeed, it is both in many other matters, and especially in friend-
citia, tener atque tractabilis; ut amici quasi, diffundantur
ship, tender and docile; so that friends are, as it were, separated
et bonis, et contrahantur incommodis. Quamo-
on the one hand by prosperity, and brought together by adversity. Wherefore,
brem iste angor qui est sæpe capiendus pro amico non tantum
that grief which is often to be undergone for a friend has not so much
valet ut tollat amicitiam e vita; non plus quam ut virtutes
power as to take away friendship out of life; any more than that virtue
repudientur quia afferunt nonnullas curas et molestias.
should be rejected because it brings some cares and troubles.

CHAPTER XIV.

AUTEM quum contrahat amicitiam, ut dixi supra, si qua significatio
But since it cements friendship, as I said above, if any token
virtutis eluceat, ad quam similis animus applicet et adjungat
of virtue gleams forth, to which a kindred mind may attach and join
se—quum id contingit, amor necesse est exoriatur. Enim
itself—when that happens, love must of necessity arise. (49.) *For*
quid tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanibus rebus,
what is so inconsistent as to take pleasure in many frivolous objects, such
ut honore, gloria, ædificio, vestitu, corporisque cultu; autem non
as honour, glory, buildings, clothes and personal refinement; and not
admodum delectari animo prædito virtute eo
to take exceeding pleasure in a spirit endowed with virtue of such a nature
qui possit vel amare, vel, itaque dicam, adamare? Enim nihil est
that it can either love, or, so to speak, return love? For nothing is
jucundius remuneratione benevolentiæ, nihil vicissi-
more pleasant than a return of goodwill, nothing more so than the inter-
tudine studiorum officiorumque. Quod si addimus illud quoque,
change of zealous duties. (50.) *But if we add this also,*
quod potest recte addi — esse nihil quod tam alliciat et
which may rightly be added—that there is nothing which so allures and
tam attrahat ullam rem, ad se quam similitudo ad amicitiam;
so attracts any thing, to itself as likeness does to friendship;

profecto, concedetur esse verum ut boni diligant bonos, ad-
then, indeed, it will be allowed to be true that the good love the good, and
sciscantque sibi, quasi, conjunctos propinquitate
attach to themselves, as it were, those who are united by ties of kinship
atque natura. Enim est nihil appetentius, nihil rapacius
and nature. For there is nothing more eager, nothing more greedy after
similium sui quam natura. Quamobrem hoc, quidem, Fanni
objects like itself than nature. Wherefore this, indeed, Fannius
et Scævola, constat, ut opinor, bonis esse quasi
and Scævola, is established, as I think, that for good men there is a kind
necessariam benevolentiam inter bonos; qui est fons amici-
of inevitable goodwill amongst the good; and this is a spring of friend-
tiæ constitutus a natura. Sed eadem bonitas pertinet ad multi-
ship ordained by nature. But the same goodness extends to the
tudinem etiam. Enim virtus est non inhumana, neque immunis,
masses also. For virtue is not unkindly, or inactive,
neque superba; etiam, quæ soleat tueri universos populos, con-
or proud; since, indeed, it is wont to protect whole nations, and
sulereque eis optime; quod profecto non faceret, si
to consult for their best interests; which it certainly would not do, if
abhorreret a caritate vulgi. Atque, etiam, qui
it recoiled from the affection of the commons. (51.) *And, indeed, those who*
fingunt amicitias causa utilitatis videntur mihi, quidem,
form friendships for the sake of advantage seem to me, at any rate,
tollere amabilissimum nodum amicitiæ. Enim non tam
to take away the most lovable tie of friendship. For it is not so much
utilitas parta per amicum quam amor ipse amici de-
advantage obtained through a friend as the love itself of a friend that gives
lectat; illudque quod profectum est ab amico tum fit jucundum
pleasure; and that which proceeds from a friend then becomes pleasant
si profectum est cum studio; tantumque abest
if it proceeds in company with zeal; and so far is it from being the case
ut amicitiæ colantur propter indigentiam, ut ii qui
that friendships are cultivated on account of need, that those who are
præditi opibus et copiis, maximeque virtute—in qua
endowed with wealth and resources, and most of all with virtue —in which
est plurimum præsidii— minime indigeant alterius, sint lib-
there is the greatest protection—and least have need of another, are most
eralissimi et beneficentissimi. Atque, quidem, haud scio
generous and liberal. And, indeed, I am rather inclined to

an sit opus nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Enim
think that there is need of our never at all being in want of friends. For
ubi nostra studia viguissent si Scipio numquam eguisset
how could my zeal have thriven if Scipio had never required
consilio, numquam nostra opera, nec domi nec militiæ? Igitur
my advice, or my help, either at home or abroad? And so
non amicitia consecuta est utilitatem, sed utilitas amicitiam.
it is not friendship that obtained advantage, but advantage friendship.

CHAPTER XV.

ERGO homines diffluentes deliciis non erunt audiendi
(52.) *And so people revelling in luxury will not have to be listened*
si quando disputabunt de amicitia, quam habent
to if at any time they shall argue on the subject of friendship, which they have
cognitam nec usu nec ratione. Nam quis est pro
known neither by experience nor in theory. For who is there by
fidem deum hominumque qui velit neque ut diligat quemquam
the faith of gods and men who wishes neither to love anyone
nec diligatur ipse ab ullo, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque
nor to be loved himself by any, to brim over with all kinds of resources and
vivere in omnium rerum abundantia? Enim hæc est vita
to live amid general plenty? For this is a life of
tyrannorum in qua nimirum potest esse nulla fides, nulla cari-
despots in which of course there can be no good faith, no affec-
tas, nulla stabilis fiducia benevolentiæ, omnia semper
tion, no firm confidence of goodwill. but everything is always full
suspecta atque sollicita; nullus locus amicitiæ.
of suspicion and anxiety; whilst there is no room for friendship. (53.)
Enim quis diligat aut eum quem metuit, aut eum a quo putat
For who can love either one whom he fears, or one by whom he thinks
se metui? Tamen coluntur simulatione, duntaxat
that he is feared? And yet such people are courted on pretence, but only
ad tempus. Quod si ceciderint, forte ut plerumque fit, tum
for a time. But if they fall, perchance as generally happens, then
intelligitur quam inopes fuerint amicorum. Quod ferunt
it is understood how destitute they were of friends. And this they say that
Tarquinium dixisse tum exsulantem se intellexisse
Tarquinius declared that at the time when he was in exile he understood

quos fidos amicos habuisset quos infidos, quum posset
who were the faithful friends he had and who the unfaithful, since he could
jam referre gratiam neutris. Quamquam, miror illa
now requite a favour to neither. (54.) *Although, indeed, I wonder with that*
superbia et importunitate si potuit habere quemquam.
pride and churlishness of his that he could have any friend at all.
Atque ut mores hujus quem dixi potuere non parare
And as the character of this man whom I have mentioned could not procure
veros amicos, sic opes multorum præpotentium excludunt
real friends, so the wealth of many very influential people precludes
fideles amicitias. Enim non solum est Fortuna cæca ipsa; sed
faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune blind herself; but she
etiam plerumque efficit eos quos complexa est cæcos. Itaque illi
also generally makes those whom she embraces blind. And so they
fere efferuntur fastidio et contumacia; neque potest
are for the most part puffed up with scorn and swelling pride; nor can
fieri quidquam intolerabilius fortunato insipiente. Atque hoc
there be anything more unbearable than a lucky fool. And this
quidem, licet videre—eos qui antea fuerunt commodis moribus
indeed, we may see—that those who formerly were people of courteous habits
immutari imperio, potestate prosperis rebus, veteresque amicitias
are changed by power, authority and prosperity, and old friendships
sperni ab iis novis indulgeri. Autem quid stultius
are scorned by them and new ones are favoured. (55.) *But what is more foolish*
quam quum plurimum possint copiis, facultatibus opibus
than when they have the greatest influence in resources, means and wealth,
parare cetera quæ parantur pecunia, equos, famu-
to provide all those other things which are procured by money, horses, servants,
los, egregiam vestem pretiosa vasa, non parare amicos,
fine wardrobes and costly vessels, and not to provide friends, the
optimam et pulcherrimam supellectilem vitæ, ita ut dicam? Et
best and most beautiful furniture of life, so to speak? For
enim, quum parant cetera nesciunt cui
indeed, when they provide all those other things they know not for whom they are
parent, nec cujus causa laborent—enim quidque is-
providing them, nor on whose account they are toiling— for each of those
torum est ejus qui vincit viribus, possessio
objects belongs to the one who is superior in strength, whilst the possession of
amicitiarum manet stabilis et certa sua cuique — ut, etiam si
friendships remains firm and sure to each individual—so that, even if

illa maneant, quæ sunt, quasi, dona fortunæ, tamen
those things should remain, which are, as it were, presents of Fortune, yet
vita inculta et deserta ab amicis possit non esse jucunda. Sed
a life unrefined and destitute of friends could not be pleasant. But of
hæc hactenus.
this thus far.

CHAPTER XVI.

AUTEM constituendi qui sint fines et termini, quasi,
(56.) *But we must determine what are the limits and boundaries, as it were*
diligendi in amicitia. De quibus video tres sententias
of loving in friendship. And on this point I see that three ideas
ferri, nullam quarum probo —unam ut simus affecti
are put forth, of none of which I approve— one, that we should be disposed
erga amicos eodem modo quo erga nosmet ipsos; alteram,
towards friends in the same way as towards ourselves; the second,
ut nostra benevolentia in amicos respondeat pariter
that our goodwill towards our friends should correspond in exactly
æqualiterque illorum benevolentiæ erga nos; tertiam, ut quisque
equal ratio to their goodwill toward us; the third, that each
fiat tanti ab amicis quanti facit se ipse.
should be made of the same account by his friends as he makes himself.
Nulli harum trium sententiarum prorsus assentior. Enim nec
With none of these three ideas do I entirely agree. For neither
est illa prima vera — ut quisque sit sic animatus in amicum
is that first one correct—that each should be so disposed towards a friend
quemadmodum in se. Enim quam multa
as he is towards himself. (57.) *For how many things there are*
quæ numquam faceremus nostra causa facimus causa
which we should never do on our own account that we do for the sake
amicorum! Precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum
of friends! To make a request of an unworthy person, to entreat, and then
invehi acerbius in aliquem, insectarique vehementius—
again to inveigh bitterly against anyone, and to attack him violently —
quæ in nostris rebus non fiunt satis honeste
things which in our own case are not done very honourably are done most
honestissime in amicorum; suntque multæ res in
honourably in the case of our friends; and there are many things in

quibus boni viri detrahunt multa de suis commodis, patiuntur-
which good men draw off much from their own advantages, and suffer it
que detrahi, ut amici fruantur iis potius quam ipsi.
to be drawn off, that their friends may enjoy them rather than themselves.

Altera sententia est quæ definit amicitiam paribus
(58.) *The second idea is one which determines friendship by equivalent*
officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc, quidem, est vocare amicitiam ad
duties and goodwill. This, indeed, is calling friendship to
calculos nimis exigue et exiliter, ut sit par
account in a too scanty and meagre manner, that there may be an equal
ratio acceptorum et datorum. Vera amicia videtur mihi esse
set-off of benefits received and given. True friendship seems to me to be
ditior et affluentior, nec observare restricte ne reddat
richer and more abundant, and not to look so closely that it do not return
plus quam acceperit. Enim est neque timendum ne quid
more than it has received. For we must not fear that anything will
excidat, aut ne quid defluat in terram, aut ne quid plus
be lost, or that anything will fall away to the ground, or that something more
æquo congeratur in amicitiam. Vero ille tertius
than is an equivalent will be accumulated on friendship. (59.) *But that third*
finis deterrimus — ut quisque fiat tanti
definition is the worst of all — that each man should be made of the same account
ab amicis quanti faciat ipse se. Enim sæpe in quibusdam aut
by his friends as he makes himself. For often in certain people either
animus est abjectior aut spes amplificandæ fortunæ
the spirit is somewhat desponding or the hope of extending their fortune
fractior. Est non igitur amici esse ta-
somewhat weak. It is not therefore the property of a friend to be of the same
lem in eum qualis ille est in se, sed potius en-
character towards the other as the other is towards him, but rather to strive
iti et efficere, ut excitet jacentem animum amici,
hard and bring it about, that he may spur on the dejected spirit of his friend,
inducatque in meliorem spem cogitationemque. Igitur alius
and lead it on to better hopes and thoughts. And so another
finis veræ amicitiæ est constituendus, si prius edixero
definition of true friendship must be established, if I shall first have proclaimed
quid Scipio sit solitus maxime reprehendere. Negabat ullam
what Scipio was wont especially to censure. He said that no
voce inimiciorem amicitiæ potuisse reperiri quam
utterance more hostile to friendship could have been found than that

ejus qui dixisset oportere ita amare ut si aliquando
of the man who had declared that one ought so to love as if at some time
esset osurus, nec, vero, posse se adduci ut crederet hoc
he were likely to hate, nor, indeed, could he be brought to believe that this
esse dictum a Biante quemadmodum putaretur, qui esset habitus
was said by Bias as was thought, who had been considered
sapiens unus e septem, sed esse sententiam cujusdam
a philosopher and one of the seven sages, but it was the idea of some
impuri aut ambitiosi, aut revocantis omnia ad suam
unscrupulous or ambitious person, or of one drawing off everything to his
potentiam. Enim quonam modo poterit quisquam esse amicus
own influence. For how can anyone be a friend to
cui putabit se posse esse inimicum? Quinetiam erit
him to whom he thinks that he may one day be an enemy? Moreover it
necesse cupere et optare ut amicus peccet quam
will be necessary to desire and wish that his friend may commit faults as
sæpissime quo dec sibi plures ansas, quasi, ad
often as possible in order that he may give him more handles, as it were, of
reprehendum, autem rursum, angi, dolere
finding fault, but on the other hand, to be vexed, grieved and
invidere recte factis commodisque amicorum. Quare hoc
jealous at the right actions and benefits of friends. (60.) *Wherefore this*
præceptum, quidem, cujuscumque est, valet ad tollendam amici-
maxim, indeed, whosever it is, tends to do away with friend-
tiam. Illud potius fuit præcipiendum—ut adhiberemus
ship. This rather should have been the rule given —that we should apply
eam diligentiam in comparandis amicitiis ut ne quando incipere-
such care in acquiring friendships as not at any time to
mus amare eum quem possemus aliquando odisse. Quinetiam, si
begin to love one whom we might at some future time hate. Moreover, if
fuissemus minus felices in deligendo, Scipio putabat id
we should have been unfortunate in our choice, Scipio thought that this
ferendum potius quam tempus inimicitiarum cogi-
ought to be borne rather than an occasion of enmity taken into
tandum.
consideration.

CHAPTER XVII.

IGITUR, arbitror, utendum his finibus—ut quum mores
(61.) *We must therefore, I think, employ this definition—that when the characters*
amicorum sint emendati, tum sit inter eos communitas
of friends have been improved, then there is between them a fellowship
omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum, sine ulla exceptione;
in all things, advice, goodwill, etc., without any exception;
etiam ut si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus justæ voluntantas
also that if by any chance it happens that unjust wishes
amicorum sint adjuvandæ, in quibus aut eorum caput aut
of friends are to be assisted, in which either their life or
fama agitur, sit declinandum de via, modo
their reputation is at stake, we must turn aside out of the way, provided that
summa turpitudo ne sequatur. Enim est quatenus
extreme disgrace does not follow. For there is a point up to which
venia possit dari amicitiæ. Nec, vero, est fama
indulgence can be granted to friendship. Neither, indeed, must reputation
negligenda, nec oportet existimare benevolentiam civium me-
be overlooked, nor must we think that the goodwill of citizens is a
diocre telum ad gerendas res; quam est turpe
trifling instrument for carrying on business; and this it is disgraceful
colligere blanditiis et assentando; virtus quam caritas sequitur
to acquire by flattery and adulation; and virtue which affection follows
est minime repudianda. Sed sæpe —etenim redeo ad
is by no means to be rejected. (62.) *But he often — for I return to*
Scipionem, cujus omnis sermo erat de amicitia— querebatur
Scipio, whose whole discourse was about friendship —used to complain
quod in omnibus rebus homines essent diligentiores, ut
that in all other matters people were more careful, so that
quisque dicere posset quot capras et oves haberet, quot
each could tell how many goats and sheep he had, but how many
amicos haberet posset non dicere; et in parandis illis
friends he had he could not say; and in procuring the former,
quidem, adhibere curam, in eligendis amicis esse negli-
indeed, people exercised care, but in the choice of friends they are care-
gentes, habere nec quædam signa, quasi, et notas quibus
less, and they have no tokens, as it were, or marks by which they
judicarent eos qui essent idonei ad amicitiam. Igitur firmi
can stamp those who are serviceable for friendship. And so people of strong

et stabiles et constantes sunt eligendi. Cujus generis est
and firm and consistent character must be chosen. And of this class there is
magna penuria, et est sane difficile judicare nisi
a great scarcity, and it is indeed a difficult matter to decide unless you have
expertum; autem experiendum est in amicitia ipsa; ita
had experience; but the experience must be had in friendship itself; and so
amicitia præcurrit judicium tollitque potestatem experiendi.
friendship forestalls judgment and takes away the opportunity of making trial.
Est igitur prudentis sustinere impetum benevolentiæ
(63.) *It is therefore the part of a wise man to restrain the impulse of goodwill*
sic ut currum, quo utamur amicitiis sic quasi tentatis
just as in a race, that we may treat friendships in the same way as tried
equis, periclitatis aliqua parte moribus amicorum. Quidam sæpe
horses, after testing to some degree the character of friends. Some men are often
perspiciuntur in parva pecunia, quam leves sint; quidam
seen through in small money matters, showing how unstable they are; some
quos parva potuit non movere cognoscuntur in
whom a small amount could not affect are discerned in the case of a
magna. Sin, vero aliqui erunt reperti qui existiment sordi-
large amount. But if, indeed, any shall be found who think it
dum præferre pecuniam amicitiæ, ubi inveniemus eos qui non
low to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not
anteponant honores, magistratus, imperia potestates opes
prefer honours, offices, military and civil power and wealth
amicitiæ; ut quum hæc sint proposita ex altera parte, ex
to friendship; so that when these are set forth on the one side, and on
altera jus amicitiæ, non multo malint illa?
the other side the privilege of friendship, they do not greatly prefer the former?
Enim natura est imbecilla ad contemnendam potentiam; etiam
For nature is weak in despising influence; and even
si sunt consecuti quam neglecta amicitia arbitrantur
if they have obtained this to the neglect of friendship they think that it
iri obscuratum quia sit non sine magna causa
will be buried in darkness because it is not without great reason that
amicitia neglecta. Itaque veræ amicitiæ
friendship has been neglected. (64.) *And so true friendships are with the*
difficillime reperiuntur in iis qui versantur in
greatest difficulty found in the case of those who are engaged in
honoribus reque publica. Ubi invenias istum qui ante-
office and State matters. For where will you find the man who pre-

ponat amici honorem suo? Quid, ut omittam hæc,
fers his friend's honour to his own? Again, to pass over these points,
quam graves quam difficiles videntur plerisque societates ca-
how serious and how hard seems to most people a fellowship in
lamitatum, ad quas est non facile inventu qui descendat?
disasters, to which it is not easy to find anyone to come down?
Quamquam Ennius recte: 'Certus amicus cernitur in in-
Although Ennius rightly says: 'A reliable friend is seen in an un-
certa re;' tamen hæc duo convincunt plerosque
reliable matter;' yet these two points prove most people guilty
levitatis et infirmitatis—si aut contemnunt in bonis rebus
of instability and weakness —if they either are scornful in prosperity
aut deserunt in malis.
or turn deserters in adversity.

CHAPTER XVIII.

IGITUR, qui præstiterit se in utraque re gravem, con-
Anyone, therefore, who shows himself in each case weighty, consis-
stantem stabilem in amicitia, hunc debemus judicare
tent and firm in friendship, this man we ought to stamp as coming
ex maxime raro et pæne divino genere hominum. Autem
from an extremely rare and almost divine class of people. (65.) *But*
firmamentum ejus stabilitatis constantiæque quam quærimus in
the foundation of that firmness and consistency which we seek in
amicitia est fides; enim nihil est stabile quod est infidum. Præ-
friendship is good faith; for nothing is firm which is unfaithful. Fur-
terea, est par simplicem, et communem et consentientem,
ther, it is right that a single-minded, and ordinary, and harmonious man,
qui moveatur iisdem rebus eligi. Omnia
one who is affected by the same things as ourselves, should be chosen. For all
quæ pertinent ad fidelitatem. Enim neque potest ingenium
these ingredients belong to faithfulness. For neither can a disposition
multiplex et tortuosum esse fidum; neque, vero, potest qui
of many folds and turns be faithful; nor, indeed, can one who is
non movetur iisdem rebus, et consentit natura, esse fidus
not affected by the same things, and of a harmonious nature, be faithful
aut stabilis. Eodem est addendum ut ne aut delectetur
or firm. To this must be added that he do not either take pleasure in

inferendis criminibus, aut credat oblatis—omnia quæ
preferring charges, or believe them when preferred— all which points
pertinent ad eam constantiam quam jamdudum tracto. Ita
belong to that consistency of which I have long been treating. And so
illud fit verum quod dixi initio— amicitiam posse non esse nisi
that becomes true which I said at first—that friendship cannot exist except
inter bonos. Enim est boni viri quem licet eundem
amongst the good. For it is the part of a good man whom we may also
dicere sapientem tenere hæc duo in amicitia— primum,
call a philosopher to hold fast to these two points in friendship— first,
ne quid sit fictum neve simulatum; enim vel odisse aperte est
that nothing be feigned or pretended; for even to hate openly is
magis ingenui quam occultare sententiam fronte;
more the mark of a generous mind than to hide our opinions by our face;
deinde, non solum repellere criminationes allatas ab ali-
in the second place, not only to rebut accusations brought by any-
quo, sed ne quidem esse suspiciosum ipsum, semper existimantem
one, but not even to be suspicious ourselves, always thinking
aliquid violatum esse ab amico. Huc oportet
that some outrage has been committed by a friend. (66). *To this must be*
accedat quædam suavitas sermonum atque morum, haudqua-
added a certain pleasantness of speech and manner, a by no means
quam mediocre condimentum amicitiæ. Autem tristitia et
slight seasoning of friendship. But moroseness and
severitas in omni re—illa quidem habet gravitatem; sed amicitia
sternness in every case—that indeed carries weight; but friendship
debet esse remissior, et liberior, et dulcior et proclivior ad
ought to be easier, and freer, and pleasanter and more inclined to
omnen comitatem facilitatemque.
general courtesy and agreeableness.

CHAPTER XIX.

Autem hoc loco exsistit quædam subdifficilis quæstio:
(67.) *Now at this point arises a somewhat difficult question:*
num quando novi amici digni amicitia sint ante-
whether at any time new friends who are worthy of friendship are to be
ponendi veteribus, ut solemus anteponere teneros vetulis equis.
preferred to old ones, as we are wont to prefer young to old horses.

Dubitatio indigna homine. Enim debent non esse satietates
It is a doubt unworthy of a man. For there ought not to be a surfeit
amicitiarum sicut aliarum rerum. Quæque veterrimæ, ut ea vina
of friendships as of other matters. All the oldest, as those wines
quæ ferunt vetustatem, debent esse suavissimæ; illudque est verum
which carry great age, ought to be the sweetest; and that is true
quod dicitur — multos modios salis esse edendos simul
which is often said—that many bushels of salt must be eaten at the same time
ut munus amicitiæ sit expletum. Autem novi-
in order that the office of friendship may be discharged. (68.) *But new*
tates, si afferunt spem ut fructus appareat tamquam in
friendships, if they bring a prospect that fruit will be seen as in
herbis non fallacibus—illæ, quidem, sunt non repudiandæ;
plants that are not deceptive —they, indeed, are not to be rejected;
tamen vetustas est conservanda suo loco. Enim
yet the older claims must be preserved in their proper place. For
maxima est vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin,
very great is the force of age and habit. Nay, in the case of
ipso equo, cujus modo feci mentionem, si nulla res im-
that very horse, of which I just now made mention, if nothing were to
pediat, est nemo qui non libentius utatur eo
stand in the way, there is no one who does not more readily use the one
quo consuevit quam intractato et novo. Nec modo
to which he is accustomed than an unbroken and new one. And not only
consuetudo valet in hoc quod est animal, sed etiam in
does habit hold good in this case which is animate, but also in the
iis quæ sunt inanimata, quum delectemur ip-
case of those things which are inanimate, since we take pleasure in those
sis locis, etiam montuosis et silvestribus, in quibus sumus
very places, even of mountains and wood, in which we have
commorati diutius. Sed maximum in amicitia
sojourned for some length of time. (69.) *But the chief point in friendship*
est superiorem esse parem inferiori. Enim sæpe
is that a superior should be on the same footing as an inferior. For often
sunt quædam excellentiæ, qualis Scipionis in nostro
there are certain points of excellence, as in the case of Scipio in our
grege, ita ut dicam. Ille numquam posuit se ante Philo,
flock, so to speak. He never put himself before Philus,
numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio, numquam amicis in-
or Rupilius, or Mummius, or any friends of

ferioris ordinis. Vero, colebat fratrem Maximum, egregium
lower rank. Indeed, he used to respect his brother Maximus, an excellent
virum omnino, nequaquam parem sibi, tamquam superiorem,
man in every way, but by no means equal to him, as if he were superior,
quod is anteibat ætate, volebatque omnes suos esse
because he preceded him in years, and he wished that all his family should be
ampliores per se. Quod est faciendum imi-
advanced in honour through him. (70.) *And this must be done and*
tandumque omnibus, ut, si sunt consecuti quam præstantiam
copied by all, so that, if they have attained to any excellence
virtutis, ingenii, fortunæ, impertiant suis,
of virtue, talent or fortune, they may communicate it to their people,
communicentque cum proximis; ut si sint nati
and share it with their nearest of kin; so that if they are born
humilibus parentibus, si habeant propinquos imbecilliores vel
of lowly parents, and if they have relations somewhat weak either
animo vel fortuna, augeant eorum opes sintque honori
in spirit or in fortune, they may increase their resources and be an honour
et dignitati eis. Ut in Fabulis, qui aliquandiu fuerint
and credit to them. Just as in the Plays, those who for some time have been
in famulatu propter ignorantiam stirpis et generis, quum
in slavery owing to ignorance about their family and race, when
sunt cogniti et inventi filii aut Deorum aut regum,
they are recognised and discovered to be sons either of gods or kings, they
tamen retinent caritatem in pastores quos multos annos
still preserve their affection towards the shepherds whom for many years
duxerunt esse patres. Quod, quidem, est profecto multo
they have thought to be their fathers. And this, indeed, is certainly much
magis faciendum in veris certisque patribus. Enim fructus
more to be done in the case of real and undoubted fathers. For the harvest
ingenii et virtutis, omnisque præstantiæ tum capitur maxi-
of talent and virtue, and all kinds of excellence is then reaped to its fullest
mus cum confertur in quemque proximum.
extent when it is bestowed on all our nearest ties.

CHAPTER XX.

Ut, igitur, ii qui sunt superiores in necessitudine amici-
(71.) *As, therefore, those who are superior in the bond of friend-*

tiæ conjunctionisque debent se exæquare cum in-
ship and intimacy ought to put themselves on the same level as their
ferioribus, sic inferiores non dolere se superari a
inferiors, so inferiors ought not to feel hurt that they are surpassed by
suis aut ingenio, aut fortuna, aut dignitate. Plerique
their friends either in talent, or in fortune, or in rank. Most of
quorum aut semper queruntur aliquid, aut, etiam, ex-
these people are either always complaining of something, or, indeed, uttering
probrant; eoque magis si putant se habere quod queant
reproaches; and all the more if they think they have anything that they can
dicere factum officiose et amice, et cum aliquo labore
say has been done in a dutiful and friendly manner, and with some exertion
suo. Odiosum genus hominum, sane, exprobrantium
on their part. A hateful class of people, indeed, are those who cast in your
officia —quæ is in quem sunt collata
teeth the services done by them—which the person on whom they are conferred
debet meminisse, non qui contulit commemorare.
ought to remember, and not the one who has conferred them to mention. (72.)
Quamobrem, ut ii qui sunt superiores debent summittere se
Wherefore, as those who are superior ought to lower themselves
in amicitia; sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. Enim
in friendship; so in some way should inferiors raise themselves. For
sunt quidam qui faciunt amicitias molestas quum putant
there are some people who make friendships troublesome when they think
ipsi se contemni—quod non fere contingit, nisi iis
themselves that they are despised—which does not usually happen, save to those
qui etiam arbitrantur se contemnendos— qui sunt
who also think themselves worthy of contempt—and who are to be
levandi hac opinione non solum verbis sed etiam opere.
relieved of this idea, not only in words but also in deed. (73.)
Autem tantum tribuendum cuique primum quantum ipse possis
But so much is to be given to each first as you yourself can
efficere; deinde, etiam, quantum ille quem diligas atque adjuves
perform; and secondly, indeed, as he whom you love and help
sustinere. Enim tu possis non, quamvis excellas licet, per-
can bear. For you could not, however superior you may be, ad-
ducere omnes tuos ad amplissimos honores, ut Scipio
vance all your friends to the highest honours, just as Scipio was
potuit efficere P. Rupilium consulem, non potuit fratrem Lucium.
able to make Publius Rupilius consul, not so his brother Lucius.

Quod etiam si possis deferre quidvis ad alterum est
But even if you could confer anything whatever on another you must
tamen videndum quid ille possit sustinere. Omnino, judicandæ
still see what he can bear. (74.) *In a word, decision*
sunt amicitiæ, et ingeniis et ætatibus jam corrobo-
must be shown in friendship, when both character and age are now estab-
ratis confirmatisque; nec, si qui ineunte ætate fuerint studiosi
lished and strengthened; nor, if any people in early life have been keen
venandi aut pilæ, oportet eos habere eos necessarios quos
after hunting or ball play, must they have the same friends as they
dilexerunt tum præditos eodem studio? enim
loved at that period as being endowed with the same predilection? for in
isto modo nutrices et pædagogi postulabunt plurimum benevolen-
that way nurses and tutors will demand the most goodwill
tiæ jure vetustatis— qui quidem sunt non negligendi
on the score of old standing—and they indeed are not to be overlooked
sed alio quodam modo; aliter amicitiæ possunt non
but must be treated in another kind of way; otherwise friendships cannot
permanere stabiles. Enim dispares mores sequuntur disparia
endure steadfast. For different natures follow different
studia, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob
pursuits, and their dissimilarity severs friendships; and it is not for
ullam aliam causam boni possunt non esse amici improbis,
any other reason that good people cannot be friends with the bad,
improbi bonis, nisi quod distantia inter eos morum studiorum-
or bad with good, except that the difference between them in habits and pursuits
que est tanta quanta maxime potest esse. Etiam, potest recte
is as great as it possibly can be. (75.) *Also, we may rightly*
præcipi in amicitiis ne quædam intemperata benevolen-
enjoin in the case of friendships that no immoderate goodwill,
tia, quod persæpe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum.
as very often happens, interfere with the great advantages of friends.
Enim, ut redeam ad Fabulas, Neoptolemus potuisset non capere
For, to return to the Plays, Neoptolemus could not have taken
Trojam si voluisset audire Lycomedem, apud quem erat
Troy if he had been willing to listen to Lycomedes, with whom he had
educatus, impedientem suum iter cum multis lacrimis.
been brought up, when trying to hinder his journey with many tears.
Et sæpe magnæ res incidunt ut sit discedendum ab amicis;
And often important events happen so that we have to part from friends;

is qui vult impedire quas quod non facile
and he who would stand in the way of these things because he cannot easily
ferat desiderium, est et infirmus mollisque natura, et, ob eam
endure regret, is both weak and soft by nature, and, for that
ipsam causam, parum justus in amicitia. Atque in omni re
very reason, unjust in friendship. (76.) *And in every case*
est considerandum, et quid postules ab amico et quid
you must take thought, both what you ask of a friend and what you
patiare impetrari a te.
allow to be obtained from you.

CHAPTER XXI.

Est etiam quædam calamitas, quasi, in dimittendis amicitiis
There is also a kind of misfortune, as it were, in breaking up friendships
nonnumquam necessaria; enim jam nostra oratio delabitur a
that is sometimes inevitable; for now our speech turns aside from
sapientium familiaritatibus ad amicitias vulgares. Vitia
philosophical intimacies to friendships of ordinary people. The faults
amicorum sæpe erumpunt quum in amicos ipsos tum in alienos;
of friends often break out both on friends themselves and on strangers;
tamen quorum infamia redundet ad amicos. Tales amicitiæ
and yet their disgrace redounds on the friends. Such friendships
igitur sunt eluendæ remissione usus, et dis-
then are to be done away with by slackening of intimacy, and to be
suendæ, ut audivi Catonem dicere, magis quam discindendæ;
unstitched, as I have heard Cato say, rather than torn asunder;
nisi quædam admodum intolerabilis injuria exarserit, ut sit
unless some extremely insufferable wrong has burst out, so that it is
neque rectum, neque honestum, neque fieri possit ut statim
neither right, nor honourable, nor possible that an immediate
alienatio disjunctioque sit non facienda. Autem sin
estrangement and separation should not take place. (77.) *But if*
quædam commutatio aut morum aut studiorum erit facta, ut
a change either of habits or pursuits shall have arisen, as
solet fieri, aut dissensio intercesserit in partibus reipublicæ—
is wont to happen, or a variance shall have occurred in the parties of the State—
enim loquor jam, ut dixi paulo ante, non de sapientium sed
for I speak now, as I said a short time ago, not about philosophical but

communibus amicitiis— erit cavendum ne non
commonplace friendships—we shall have to take care lest it should not
solum videantur amicitiæ depositæ, sed etiam inimicitiæ
only appear that friendships have been laid aside, but also that enmities
susceptæ. Enim nihil est turpius quam gerere bellum cum eo
have arisen. For nothing is baser than to wage war with one
quicum vixeris familiariter. Scipio, ut scitis, re-
with whom you have lived on intimate terms. Scipio, as you know, had
moverat se ab amicitia Q. Pompeii meo nomine;
withdrawn himself from the friendship of Quintus Pompeius on my account;
autem propter dissensionem quæ erat in republica est alienatus
but on account of a division which there was in the State he was estranged
a nostro collega Metello; utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate,
from our colleague Metellus; in each case he acted with dignity, influence,
et non acerba offensione animi. Quamobrem, primum,
and no bitter annoyance of spirit. (78.) *Wherefore, in the first place,*
est danda opera, ne qua discidia amicorum fiant; sin ali-
we must lend our assistance, that no separations of friends arise; but if any-
quid tale evenerit, ut amicitiæ videantur esse exstinctæ
thing of the kind occurs, that friendships may seem to have been put out
potius quam oppressæ. Vero est cavendum amicitiæ ne etiam
rather than crushed. But we must take care that friendships do not also
convertant se in graves inimicitias, ex quibus jurgia, maledicta,
turn into serious enmities, from which quarrels, abuses,
contumeliæ gignuntur. Tamen, si quæ erunt tolerabiles sunt
and despitefulness arise. And yet, if these are endurable they must
ferendæ; et hic honos est tribuendus amicitiæ veteri —
be borne; and this respect must be paid to a friendship of long standing—
ut is sit in culpa qui faciat injuriam non qui patiatur.
that he is at fault who does the wrong and not the one who suffers it.
Omnino, omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum est
In short, in all these defects and disadvantages there
una cautio, atque una provisio — ut
is one thing to guard, and one thing to provide against—that people do
ne incipiant diligere nimis cito neve non dignos. Autem
not begin to love too quickly or unworthy objects. (79.) *Now*
sunt digni amicitia in quibus ipsis inest causa cur
they are worthy of friendship in whose own persons there exists a reason why
diligantur. Rarum genus! et, quidem, omnia præclara
they should be loved. A rare class indeed! and, in truth, all excellent things are

rara ; nec quidquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit perfectum
rare ; nor is anything more difficult than to find that which is perfect
in suo genere ex omni parte. Sed plerique neque norunt quid-
of its kind on every side. But most people do not know any-
quam bonum in humanis rebus nisi quod sit fructuosum ; et,
thing good in human life save that which is profitable ; and,
amicos tamquam pecudes, diligunt eos potissimum ex quibus
with friends as with cattle, they love those most from whom
sperant se esse capturos maximum fructum. Ita carent
they hope that they will derive the greatest profit. (80.) *So they miss*
illa pulcherrima et maxime naturali amicitia
that very beautiful and most natural friendship which is to be
expetenda per se et propter se ; nec sunt exemplo ipsi
sought of itself and on account of itself ; nor are they an example to them-
se qualis sit et quanta hæc vis amicitiæ. Enim quisque
selves of the character and power of this force of friendship. For everyone
diligit ipse se non ut exigat aliquam mercedem a se
loves himself not that he may require any recompense from himself
suæ caritatis, sed quod quisque est per se carus sibi.
for his own affection, but because each man is in himself dear to himself. And
Nisi quod idem transferetur in amicitiam, verus amicus
unless this same principle is applied to friendship, a true friend
numquam reperietur ; enim is, quidem, est tamquam alter ego.
will never be found ; for he, indeed, is as it were a second self.
Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus nantibus,
(81.) *But if this is seen in the brute creation, in the flying and swimming*
agrestibus, cicuribus feris, primum, ut
kind, in the creatures of the field both tame and wild, first, that they
diligant se ipsæ—enim id nascitur pariter cum omni animante —
love themselves— for that is born equally with every living creature—
deinde, ut requirant atque appetant animantes ejusdem
and secondly, that they look out and seek for living creatures of the same
generis ad quas applicent se —idque faciunt cum desiderio
kind to which they may attach themselves—and this they do with a longing
et cum quadam similitudine humani amoris— quanto magis
and with a kind of resemblance to human love —how much the more does
id natura fit in homine, qui et diligit ipse se et
this naturally take place in the case of man, who both loves himself and
anquirit alterum, cujus animum ita misceat cum suo ut
seeks for another, whose spirit he may so blend with his own as
efficiat pæne unum ex duobus ?
to make almost one being out of two ?

CHAPTER XXII.

SED plerique, perverse, ne dicam impudenter, volunt
(82.) *But most people, in a contrary, not to say a shameless manner, wish*
habere talem amicum quales possunt non esse ipsi; quæque
to have such a friend as they cannot be themselves; and what they
non ipsi tribuunt amicis desiderant ab iis. Autem,
do not themselves give to their friends they look for from them. Now,
est par primum virum esse bonum ipse, tum quærere
it is right that in the first place a man should be good himself, and then seek
alterum similem sui. In talibus ea stabilitas amicitiæ
for another like himself. In such cases that firmness of friendship
quam jamdudum tractamus potest confirmari, quum homines
of which we have long been treating can be established, when people
conjuncti benevolentia, primum, imperabunt iis cupiditatibus
united in goodwill, in the first place, control those desires
quibus ceteri serviunt, deinde, gaudebunt æquitate jus-
to which all others are slaves, and, in the next place, rejoice in fairness and
titiaque, suscipietque omnia alter pro altero, neque umquam
equity, and undertake everything one for the other, and never will
alter postulabit ab altero quidquam nisi honestum et rectum;
either ask of the other anything save what is honourable and right;
neque solum inter se colent ac diligent, sed etiam vere-
and not only will they show mutual respect and love, but also rev-
buntur. Nam tollit maximum ornamentum amicitiæ qui tollit
erence. For he takes away the greatest ornament of friendship who takes
verecundiam ex ea. Itaque est perniciosus error in
reverence out of it. (83.) *And so it is a fatal mistake in the case*
iis qui existimant licentiam omnium libidinum peccatorumque
of those who think that full scope to every lust and sin
patere in amicitia. Amicitia est data a natura adjutrix
is opened up in friendship. Friendship was given by nature as a handmaid
virtutum, non comes vitiorum; ut quoniam virtus posset
to virtue, and not as an associate in vice; so that since virtue could
non pervenire solitaria ad ea quæ sunt summa, pervenire
not arrive by herself at that which is the highest, she might do so
conjuncta et consociata cum altera. Si aut est, aut
in combination and company with another. And if there either is, or
fuit, aut est futura, quæ societas inter quos, eorum comitatus
has been, or shall be, this fellowship between any people, their companionship

est habendus optimus beatissimusque, ad naturæ summum
must be considered the best and happiest, with a view to nature's highest
bonum. Hæc, inquam, est societas in qua omnia insunt
good. (84.) *This, I say, is the fellowship in which everything is found*
quæ homines putant expetenda —honestas, gloria, tranquillitas
which people think ought to be sought for— honour, fame, peace
atque jucunditas animi; ut quum hæc adsint vita sit beata,
and happiness of spirit; so that when these are present life is happy,
et sine his possit non esse. Quum quod sit optimum maxi-
and without these it cannot be so. And since this is the best and most
mumque, si volumus adipisci id, opera est danda virtuti, sine
important, if we wish to attain to it, help must be given to virtue, without
qua possumus consequi neque amicitiam neque ullam rem expe-
which we can attain neither friendship nor any object to be
tendam. Vero ea neglecta, qui arbitrantur se habere
sought after. But if this is overlooked, those who think they have
amicos, tum denique sentiunt se errasse, quum
friends, then at length perceive that they have made a mistake, when
aliquis gravis casus cogit experiri. Quocirca—enim
any serious crisis forces them to apply the test. (85.) *Wherefore— for*
est dicendum sæpius —quum judicaveris oportet
this must be said frequently— when you have made your decision you must
diligere, non quum dilexeris judicare. Sed quum in
love, and not when you have loved make your decision. But both in
multis rebus plectimur negligentia, tum maxime in et
many cases we are punished in the matter of carelessness, and especially in both
diligendis et colendis amicis; enim utimur præposteris consiliis
the selection and courting of friends; for we adopt inconsistent plans
et agimus acta, quod vetamur veteri
and keep doing things over again, which we are forbidden to do by the old
proverbio. Nam implicati citro et ultro, vel diuturno usu
adage. For entangled on this side and that, either in prolonged intercourse
vel etiam officiis, repente, aliqua offensione exorta, dirum-
or even duties, suddenly, when some occasion of offence arises, we break
pimus amicitias in medio cursu.
asunder friendships in the midst of their career.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Quo tanta incuria rei maxime necessariæ est
(86.) *Wherefore so great carelessness in a matter so highly necessary is*
etiam magis vituperanda. Enim amicitia est una in rebus
even more reprehensible. For friendship is the one thing in the affairs
humanis de utilitate cujus omnes consentiunt uno ore;
of men about the advantage of which all agree with one consent;
quamquam virtus ipsa contemnitur a multis, et dicitur esse quæ-
although virtue itself is despised by many, and is said to be a kind
dam venditatio atque ostentatio. Multi despiciunt divitias
of vaunting and display. Many people look down on riches
quos contentos parvo tenuis victus cultusque delectat;
whom satisfied with a little humble fare and mode of life delight; and
honores, vero, cupiditate quorum quidam inflam-
as to posts of honour, indeed, with a desire for which some people are all
mantur, quam multi ita contemnunt ut existiment
aflame, how many there are who so despise them that they think
nihil inanius nihil levius! Itemque cetera quæ vi-
nothing more empty or more trivial! And also all other things which seem
dentur quibusdam admirabilia, sunt permulti qui putent pro
to some people so excellent, there are very many who regard them as
nihilo! De amicitia omnes, ad unum, idem sentiunt, et
nothing! But about friendship all, to a man, have the same feeling, both
ii qui contulerunt se ad rempublicam, et ii qui delectan-
those who have betaken themselves to public life, and those who take delight
tur cognitione rerum doctrinaque, et ii qui gerunt suum
in the knowledge of matters and in learning, and those who carry on their
negotium otiosi, postremo ii qui tradiderunt se totos
business at their ease, and lastly those who have given themselves up entirely
voluptatibus— sentiunt sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si
to pleasure —they all feel that without friendship life is nothing, if
modo velint vivere ex aliqua parte liberaliter. Enim nescio
only they wish to live in some degree nobly. (87.) *For somehow or*
quomodo amicitia serpit per vitas omnium, nec patitur
other friendship creeps through the lives of all, and does not allow
ullam rationem degendæ ætatis esse expertem sui. Quinetiam, si
any method of passing life to be free from itself. Moreover, if
quis est ea asperitate et immanitate naturæ ut fugiat atque
anyone is of such harshness and barbarity of nature as to avoid and

oderit congressus hominum, qualem accepimus fuisse Timonem,
hate the society of men, such as we have heard was Timon,
nescio quem Athenis; tamen is possit non pati non ut anquirat
some man or other at Athens; yet he could not endure not to seek out
aliquem apud quem evomat virus suæ acerbitatis. Atque hoc
someone on whom to let loose the poison of his bitterness. And this
maxime judicaretur si quid tale possit contingere—ut
would best be decided if something of this sort could happen — that
aliquis Deus tolleret nos ex hac frequentia hominum et colloca-
some god should remove us from this society of men and place
ret uspiam in solitudine, atque ibi suppeditans abundiam et
us somewhere in a desert spot, and there supplying fulness and
copiam omnium rerum quas natura desiderat, eriperet
abundance of all things that nature longs for, should take from us
potestatem adspiciendi hominis omnino.
the power of seeing any human being at all.

Quis esset tam ferreus qui posset ferre eam vitam, cuique
Who could be so unfeeling as to be able to endure that life, and from whom
solitudo non auferret fructum omnium voluptatum?
the solitary state would not take away the enjoyment of all pleasures?

Ergo illud est verum quod audivi nostros senes commemo-
(88.) *And so that is true which I have heard our elders relate*
rare solitum dici a Archyta Tarentino, ut opinor auditum
as accustomed to be said by Archytas of Tarentum, as I think and heard
ab aliis senibus:—Si quis ascendisset in cœlum perspexissetque
by other old men:— If anyone should mount up to heaven and survey the
naturam mundi, et pulchritudinem siderum, illam admira-
nature of the universe, and the beauty of the constellations, that marvel
tionem fore insuavem ei; quæ fuisset jucun-
would be without pleasure for him; whereas it would have been most
dissima si habuisset aliquem cui narraret. Sic
pleasant if he had had anyone to whom he might relate it. To such extent
natura amat nihil solitarium, semperque annititur ad aliquod
does nature love nothing lonely, and always leans against some
adminiculum tamquam; quod in amicissimo
prop as it were; and this in the case of a very dear friend
quoque est dulcissimum.
also is most delightful.

CHAPTER XXIV.

SED, quum natura eadem declaret tot signis quid velit,
But, although nature again shows by so many tokens what she wishes,
anquirat ac desideret, tamen, nescio quomodo obsurdescimus,
seeks and longs after, yet, somehow or other we are deaf, and
nec audimus ea quæ monemur ab ea. Enim usus
do not hear the warnings which are given us by her. For the intercourse of
amicitiæ est varius et multiplex, multæque causæ suspicionum
friendship is diverse and manifold, and many grounds for suspicion and
offensionumque dantur, quas est sapientis tum
offence are offered, and these it is the mark of a philosopher at one time
evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre. Illa una
to avoid, at another time to mitigate, and anon to endure. This one ground of
offensio est sublevanda ut et veritas et fides retineatur
offence must be mitigated so that both truth and good faith may be maintained
in amicitia; nam amici sunt sæpe monendi et objurgandi; et
in friendship; for friends must often be both advised and rebuked; and
hæc accipienda amice quum fiunt benevole. Sed,
this must be taken in a friendly manner when it is done with goodwill. (89.) *But,*
nescio quomodo, est verum quod meus familiaris dicit in
somehow or other, that is true which my friend says in the
Andria: 'Obsequium parit amicos veritas odium.' Veritas
Andria: 'Complaisance begets friends and truth begets hatred.' Truth is
molesta, si, quidem, odium nascitur ex ea, quod est venenum
troublesome, if, indeed, hatred springs from it, which is the bane of
amicitiæ; sed obsequi multo molestius, quod indulgendo
friendship; but complaisance is much more troublesome, because by favouring
peccatis sinit amicum ferri præcipitem; autem maxima
faults it allows a friend to be carried away headlong; but the greatest
culpa est in eo qui et aspernatur veritatem, et obsequio
fault is in him who both scorns truth, and by complaisance is
impellitur in fraudem. Igitur, in hac re, omnis ratio et
spurred on to deceit. And so, in this matter, every reflection and
diligentia est habenda, primum, ut admonitio careat acerbitate,
care must be taken, first, that advice is free from bitterness,
deinde objurgatio careat contumelia. Autem in obsequio —
and next that reproof is free from insult. But in complaisance—
quoniam lubenter utimur verbo Terentiano—comitas
since we gladly employ this expression of Terence — courtesy should be

adsit, assentatio, adjutrix vitiorum, amoveatur procul;
present, but flattery, the handmaid of vice, should be kept away at a distance:
quæ est non modo digna amico, sed ne quidem libero; nam
for it is not only not worthy of a friend, but not even of a free-man; for
vivitur aliter cum amico aliter cum tyranno.
we live on different terms with a friend to those on which we live with a despot.

(90.) Autem cujus aures sunt clausæ veritati, ut nequeat
Now a person whose ears are closed to truth, so that he cannot
audire verum ab amico—hujus salus est desperanda.
hear the truth from a friend— that man's welfare must be despaired of.
Enim scitum est illud Catonis, ut multa—
For clever is that saying of Cato, as are many of his sayings—'That
'Acerbos inimicos mereri melius de quibusdam, quam eos amicos
bitter enemies deserve better of some people than those friends
qui videantur dulces; illos sæpe dicere verum, hos num-
who seem so sweet; for the former often speak the truth, the latter never.'
quam.' Atque illud, est absurdum—quod ii qui monentur
And this, indeed, is inconsistent — that those who are advised do
non capiunt eam molestiam quam debent capere, capiunt
not conceive that annoyance which they ought to conceive but they conceive
eam qua debent vacare. Enim non anguntur se
that from which they ought to be free. For they are not grieved that they
peccasse ferunt moleste objurgari; quod,
have done wrong, but they take it amiss if they are reproved; whereas, on the
contra, oportebat dolere delicto gaudere correctione.
other hand, they should have been grieved at the fault and rejoice in the reproof.

CHAPTER XXV.

(91.) Ut, igitur, et monere et moneri est proprium veræ
As, therefore, both to give and receive advice is a mark of true
amicitiæ, et alterum libere non aspere facere,
friendship, and in the one case generous and not harsh administering, and
alterum patienter non repugnanter accipere, sic est haben-
in the other a meek and not rebellious acceptance, so we must main-
dum esse nullam majorem pestem in amicitiis quam adula-
tain that there is no greater plague in friendships than fawn-
tionem, blanditiam, assentationem. Enim hoc vitium est no-
ing, adulation, and flattering. For this vice must be

tandum quamvis multis nominibus levium atque fallacium
branded by however many terms as belonging to vain and treacherous
hominum, loquentium omnia ad voluntatem, nihil
people, who say everything with a view to please, and nothing
ad veritatem. Autem quum est simulatio omnium
with a view to truth. (92.) *But not only is pretence in all*
rerum vitiosa—enim tollit judicium veri adulteratque id—
cases bad — for it takes away the decision of truth and debases it —
tum maxime repugnat amicitiæ; enim delet veritatem,
but also it is most opposed to friendship; for it destroys truth,
sine qua nomen amicitiæ potest non valere. Nam quum vis
without which the name of friendship cannot avail. For since the force
amicitiæ sit in eo—ut unus animus, quasi, fiat ex
of friendship lies in this—that one spirit, as it were, is formed out
pluribus—qui poterit id fieri si ne quidem in uno quoque
of several —how could that happen if not even in one single person
animus erit semper unus idemque, sed varius, commutabilis,
the spirit is always one and the same, but different, changeable, and
multiplex. Enim quid potest esse tam flexibile tam devium
manifold. (93.) *For what can be so variable and so shifting*
quam animus ejus qui convertitur, non modo ad sensum ac
as the spirit of him who turns round, not only at the feelings and
voluntatem alterius, sed etiam vultum atque nutum? 'Quis
wish of another, but even at his beck and nod? 'Does anyone
negat? Nego. Ait? Aio. Postremo, egomet
say no? I say no. Does anyone say yes? I say yes. In short I
imperavi mihi assentari omnia,' ut Terentius ait idem;
have ordered myself to be complaisant in everything,' as Terence says again;
sed ille sub persona Gnathonis; adhibere quod genus
but he speaks in the character of Gnatho; and to employ this class
amici est omnino levitatis. Autem quum sint
of friend is altogether a mark of inconstancy. (94.) *But since there are*
multi similes Gnathonum, superiores loco, fortuna,
many people like these Gnathos, though more exalted in position, means, and
fama, assentatio horum est molesta quum ad vanitatem
reputation, the complaisance of such men is troublesome when to untruthfulness
accessit auctoritas. Autem blandus amicus potest tam se-
is added influence. (95.) *But a flattering friend can be as easily*
cerni et internosci a vero, adhibita diligentia, quam
discerned and distinguished from a true one, if you apply proper care, as

omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris.
any dyed or counterfeited colour from those that are genuine and true.
Concio, quæ constat ex imperitissimis, ta-
And a general assembly, which is composed of the most ignorant people, is never-
men solet judicare quid intersit inter popularem— id est,
theless wont to decide what is the difference between a popular —that is,
assentatorem et levem civem— et constantem, severum, et
a flattering and inconstant citizen —and one who is consistent, serious, and
gravem. Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat
of weight. (96.) *With what soft words did Caius Papirius lately steal*
in aures contionis, quum ferret Legem de reficiendis
into the ears of the assembly, when he proposed his measure for re-electing
Tribunis Plebis. Nos dissuasimus; sed nihil de
the Tribunes of the Plebs. I spoke against it; but I will say nothing of
me, libentius dicam de Scipione. Quanta immortales
myself, but will more willingly speak of Scipio. How great ye immortal
Dii fuit gravitas, quanta dignitas in oratione! Ut fa-
gods was his weight, how great the dignity in his speech! So that you might
cile diceres ducem Romani populi. Sed affuistis, et
easily call him the leader of the Roman people. But you were present, and
oratio est in manibus. Itaque popularis lex est repudiata
his speech is in our hands. And so a popular measure was rejected
populi suffragiis. Atque ut redeam ad me, meministis, con-
by the people's votes. And to return to myself, you remember, in the
sulibus Q. Maximo, Scipionis fratre, et L. Mancino, quam
consulship of Quintus Maximus, Scipio's brother, and Lucius Mancinus, how
popularis de Sacerdotiis lex C. Licinii Crassi videbatur?
popular the priesthood Bill of Caius Licinius Crassus appeared?
Enim cooptatio collegiorum transferebatur ad beneficium po-
For the election of the gilds was to be handed over to the favour of the
puli. Atque is primus instituit agere cum populo
people. And he was the first to introduce the practice of treating with the people
versus in forum; tamen religio immortalium deorum
with his face towards the Forum; yet the sanctity of the immortal gods
nobis defendentibus facile vincebat illius vendibilem orationem.
under my defence easily prevailed over his popular speech.
Atque id est factum me prætore, quinquennio antequam sum
And this was done in my prætorship, five years before I was
factus consul. Ita illa causa est defensa re magis quam
appointed consul. So that cause was defended by actual fact rather than
auctoritate.
by influence.

CHAPTER XXVI.

QUOD si in scena—id est, in concione in qua est pluri-
(97.) *But if on the stage—that is, in the assembly in which there is very*
mum loci rebus fictis et adumbratis—verum valet, tamen
much room for counterfeit and fiction — truth prevails, in spite of all
(si modo id est patefactum et illustratum), quid oportet fieri in
(if only it is revealed and made clear), what must be the case in
amicitia, quæ perpenditur tota veritate? In qua, nisi
friendship, which is estimated entirely by truth? And in this, unless you
videas apertum pectus, ut dicitur, ostendasque tuum,
could see an open heart, as the saying is, and show one on your side, you
habeas nihil fidum, nihil exploratum; ne quidem amare
would have no good faith, and no certainty; you could not even love
aut amari, quum ignores quam fiat vere. Quam-
or be loved, since you would not know how far it was done with truth. Al-
quam ista assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, potest tamen nocere
though that flattery, however injurious it may be, can nevertheless hurt
nemini nisi ei qui recipit eam atque delectatur ea. Ita
no one excepting him who welcomes it and takes pleasure in it. And so it
fit ut is maxime patefaciat suas aures assentatoribus qui
happens that he most readily opens his ears to the flatterers who
assentetur sibi ipse et maxime delectet se ipse. Virtus est
flatters himself and is most pleased with himself. (98.) *Virtue is*
omnino sui amans; enim novit se ipsa optime intelligitque quam
altogether a self-lover; for it knows itself best and understands how
amabilis sit; autem ego nunc loquor non de virtute sed de
loveable it is; but I am now speaking not about virtue but about
opinione virtutis. Enim virtute ipsa non tam multi
the idea of virtue. For with virtue itself there are not so many people
volunt esse præditi quam videri. Assentatio delectat hos;
who wish to be endowed as to seem so. Flattery delights these people;
quum sermo fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem adhibetur,
and when a discourse framed according to their own wishes is applied,
putant illam vanam orationem esse testimonium suarum
they think that that empty speech is an evidence of their
laudum. Hæc amicitia igitur est nulla, quum alter non vult
merits. This friendship then is of no account, when one does not wish

audire verum alter est paratus ad mentiendum. Nec
to hear the truth and the other is prepared to speak falsely. Nor would
assentatio parasitorum in Comœdiis videretur faceta nobis nisi
the flattery of the parasites in the Comedies seem humourous to us unless
milites essent gloriosi. 'Vero Thais agere mihi magnas
soldiers were vain-boasting. 'Does, then, Thais give me great
gratias?' Erat satis respondere, 'Magnas;' inquit, 'Ingentes.'
thanks?' It were sufficient to answer, 'Great;' but he says, 'Immense.'
Assentator semper auget id quod is ad cujus voluntatem
A flatterer always exaggerates that which he for whose pleasure the word
dicitur vult esse magnum. Quamobrem, quamvis ista blanda
is spoken wishes to be magnified. (99.) *Wherefore, although that smooth-tongued*
vanitas valeat apud eos qui ipsi allectant et invitant illam,
vanity prevails among those who themselves entice and allure it,
tamen etiam graviores constantioresque sunt admonendi ut
yet even more serious and more consistent people must be warned to
animadvertant ne capiantur callida assentatione. Enim aperte
take care not to be caught by cunning flattery. For an open
adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui est admodum
flatterer anyone can see through, except a person who is exceedingly
excors; est studiose cavendum ille callidus et
dull; but we must take the most zealous care that the cunning and
occultus ne insinuet se. Enim, nec facillime
secret flatterer does not steal into our hearts. For, indeed, he is not very easily
cognoscitur, quippe qui sæpe assentetur etiam adversando, et
recognised, since he often flatters even by opposition, and whilst
simulans se litigare, blandiatur, atque ad extremum
pretending that he is quarrelling with us, fawns on us, and at last
det manus, patiaturque se vinci; ut is qui sit
gives in and allows himself to be overcome; so that he who has been
illusus videatur vidisse plus. Autem quid
played with may appear to have seen more than the other. But what is more
turpius quam illudi? quod ne accidat est
disgraceful than to be played upon? and that this may not happen we must take
magis cavendum ut in 'Epiclero':—'Hodie versaris atque
more care as in 'The Heir':—'To day you will have twisted and
lautissime emunxeris me ante omnes stultos senes Comicos.'
most completely cajoled me above all foolish old men in Comedy.'

Enim etiam in Fabulis hæc persona improvidorum et credu-
(100.) *For even in the Plays this character of careless and credu-*

lorum senum est stultissima. Sed, nescio quo pacto,
lous old men is the most foolish of all. But, somehow or other, my
oratio deflexit ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum— id
speech has turned aside from the friendships of perfect men— that
est, sapientum— dico de hac sapientia, quæ videtur
is, philosophers—and I am speaking of that philosophy, which seems
posse cadere in hominem—ad leves amicitias. Quamo-
possible to fall to the lot of man— to commonplace friendships. Where-
brem redeamus ad illa prima, concl amusque aliquando
fore let us return to those first points, and let us finish at length
ea ipsa.
those particulars.

CHAPTER XXVII.

VIRTUS, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci,
It is virtue, virtue, I say, Caius Fannius, and you, Quintius Mucius,
et conciliat et conservat amicitias. Enim in ea est conven-
which both cements and preserves friendships. For in it lies a fit-
ientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia. Quum quæ extulit
ness of things, in it is firmness, and also consistency. And when it raises
se, et ostendit suum lumen, et aspexit agnovitque idem in
itself, and displays its light, and beholds and recognises similarity in
alio, ad id se admovet, accipitque vicissim illud quod
another, to that similarity it advances, and receives in turn what
est in altero; ex quo exardescit eorum, sive
is in that other; and herefrom there blazes forth their mutual feeling, whether
amor sive amicitia. Enim utrumque est dictum ab amando;
you call it love or friendship. For both terms are named from loving;
autem amare est nihil aliud nisi diligere eum ipsum quem
now to love is nothing else than to care for that very person whom
ames, quæsita nulla indigentia nulla utilitate. Tamen quæ
you love, looking for neither want nor advantage. And yet this latter
ipsa efflorescit ex amicitia, etiam si tu sis minus secutus
naturally blossoms forth out of friendship, even if you have not followed
eam. Hac benevolentia, nos adolescentes
after it. (101.) *With such feeling of good-will, we in early manhood*

dileximus illos senes, L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Gallum,
loved those old men, Lucius Paulius, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus,
P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum, nostri Scipionis socerum.
Publius Nasica, and Tiberius Gracchus, our friend Scipio's father-in-law.
Hæc elucet etiam magis inter æquales, ut,
And this gleams forth even more among those of the same age, as, for instance,
inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp.
between myself and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, and Spurius,
Mummium. Vicissim, autem, senes acquiescimus in caritate
Mummius. In turn, moreover, we old men take pleasure in the affection
adolescentium, ut in vestra ut in Q. Tuberonis;
of the young, as in that of yourselves and of Quintus Tubero; and,
equidem, etiam admodum delector familiaritate adolescentis
indeed, I find a very excessive pleasure in the intimacy of the young man
P. Rutilii, A. Virginii. Quoniamque ratio nostræ vitæ
Publius Rutilius, and Aulus Virginius. And since the plan of our life
naturæque est ita comparata ut alia ætas oriatur ex alia, est,
and nature is so arranged that one age springs from another, it is,
quidem, maxime optandum ut possis pervenire ad calcem, ut
indeed, most greatly to be desired that you may arrive at the goal, as
dicitur, cum iisdem æqualibus quibus cum sis emissus,
the saying is, with those same contemporaries with whom you set out,
tamquam, e carceribus. Sed quoniam res humanæ
as it were, from the starting-post. (102.) *But since the affairs of men*
sunt fragiles caducæque, aliqui sunt semper anquirendi quos
are frail and fleeting, some persons must always be sought whom
diligamus, et a quibus diligamur; enim caritate benevo-
we may love, and by whom we may be loved in turn; for if affection and
lentiaque sublata, omnis jucunditas est sublata e vita. Mihi,
good-will are taken away, all pleasure is taken out of life. To me,
quidem, Scipio—quamquam est ereptus subito— tamen
indeed, Scipio — although he was snatched away suddenly—nevertheless
vivit semperque vivet; enim virtutem illius viri
lives and always will live; for it was the virtue of that great man
amavi; quæ est non exstincta. Nec versatur ante
that I loved; and this has not been destroyed. Nor does it move before
oculos mihi soli, qui semper habui illam in manibus, sed
the eyes of myself alone, who have always had it close to hand, but
etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. Nemo umquam sus-
even in future ages it will be renowned and famous. No one will ever con-

cipiet majora animo aut spe qui non putet illius
ceive greater projects in spirit or hope without thinking that that man's
memoriam atque imaginem proponendam. Equidem, ex
memory and picture must be set before him. (103.) *Indeed, of*
omnibus rebus quas aut fortuna aut natura dedit mihi, habeo
all things which either fortune or nature has given me, I have
nihil quod possim comparare cum Scipionis amicitia. In hac
nothing that I can compare with Scipio's friendship. In this
fuit consensus de republica, in hac consilium privatarum
consisted my agreement on State matters, in this the plans of my private
rerum, in eadem requies, plena oblectationis. Numquam offendi
life, in this again my repose, so full of delight. Never did I offend
illum, ne quidem minima re, quod, quidem, senserim;
him, not even in the slightest matter, as far, indeed, as I could perceive;
nihil audivi ipse ex eo quod nollem. Erat una domus
nothing did I hear myself from him which I disliked. We had one home and
idem victus, isque communis; neque solum mili-
the same manner of life, and that shared by both; and not only our military
tia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque com-
service, but also our travels and our country sojourns were taken
munes. Nam quid ego dicam de studiis semper
together. (104.) *For why should I speak about our pursuits of always*
cognoscendi atque discendi aliquid, in quibus contrivimus omne
finding out and learning something, in which we spent all
otiosum tempus, remoti ab oculis populi? Si recordatio
our leisure time, far away from the eyes of the world. And if the recollection
et memoria quarum rerum occidisset una cum illo,
and memory of these things had died at the same time with him,
possem nullo modo ferre desiderium conjunctissimi atque
I could in no way endure the regret for that most friendly and
amantissimi viri. Sed illa sunt nec exstincta; potiusque aluntur
loving man. But they have not died; they are rather fostered
et augentur cogitatione et memoria; et si essem plane orbatus
and increased by thought and memory; and if I were entirely bereft
illis, tamen ætas ipsa afferret mihi magnum solatium; enim jam
of them, yet age itself would bring men great comfort; for now
possum non diutius esse in hoc desiderio. Autem omnia
I cannot much longer abide in this regret But everything that
brevia debent esse tolerabilia, etiam si sunt magna. Hæc
is short-lived ought to be endurable, even if it is great. This is

habui quæ dicerem de amicitia. Autem hortor vos ut ita
what I had to say about friendship. But I urge you to give such
locetis virtutem— sine qua amicitia potest non esse—ut putetis
a position to virtue —without which friendship cannot exist —as to think
excepta ea nihil præstabilius amicitia.
that with the exception of it nothing is more excellent than friendship.